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I. INTRODUCTION
From the time that the first lawyers set foot in what is now the
United States, society has engaged in efforts to regulate lawyers' fees,
including fees received from clients in bankruptcy1 proceedings. Law-
yers, in turn, have been engaged in continuing efforts to: secure their
self-interests, aggrandize their role in society, be free of societally im-
posed constraints on their fees and activities, and carve out an ever
larger area of exclusive domain. Although lawyers have not fared as
well in their recent efforts to extend the scope of their monopoly by
the use of statutes that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law2 and
may even be on the verge of seeing their monopoly erode,3 they have
been more successful in securing other aspects of their self-interest and
in using their positions of authority to create rules exempting them-
selves from the reach of laws and doctrines that they, as lawyers, have
been instrumental in establishing or enacting to regulate the conduct
of others.
4
1. The term "bankruptcy" can be traced back to Roman law. In the Italian city-
states "it was called bankca rupta after a medieval custom of breaking the bench of a
banker or tradesman who absconded with property of his creditors." THOMAS H. JACK-
SoN, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1 (1986).
2. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 209 (1990); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Mo-
nopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibi-
tions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (advocating relaxation of unauthorized practice prohibi-
tions in certain areas).
3. See Kathleen E. Justice, Note, There Goes the Monopoly: The California Pro-
posal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1991).
4. It's Christmastime [sic] for. . . lawyers. If a doctor is negligent in saving a
human life, the doctor pays. If a priest is negligent in saving the spirit of a
1992] 1039
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Thus, lawyers have been instrumental in creating rules for evaluat-
ing the practice of medicine that are highly favorable to lawyers' in-
comes, but have avoided the application of those same rules to lawyer
malpractice. 5 Lawyers also have created special rules that exempt
themselves from liability to third parties while extending liability to
other professionals such as accountants and doctors.6 Lawyers also
have been quite successful in their determined resistance to societal
efforts to regulate their fees.
7
human, the priest pays. But if a lawyer is negligent in advising his client as to
a settlement, the client pays.. .. Should we change the law so that non-law-
yers can be judges?
Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346,
1352-53 (Pa. 1991) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
5. See Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers:
Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and. Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW
149, 151 n.9 (1988).
6. Id. Consider how the rules regarding third-party liability, which are established
by judges who are lawyers, would be different if they were written by judges who were
accountants: "Should we change the law so that non-lawyers can be judges?" Muham-
mad, 587 A.2d at 1353.
7. Contingent fees, a source of enormous wealth to lawyers, are a prominent ex-
ample. Contingent fees in personal injury cases alone yield $13 billion annually to law-
yers. See Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1417, 1429 n.68 (1991) [hereinafter Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle]. It is
black letter law that courts have the inherent authority to monitor contingent fees and
must closely superintend contingent fees to protect -clients from being overreached by
their lawyers. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55-56 & n.97, 64-66, 73-74 (1989)
[hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees]. When the American Bar Association first ap-
proved contingent fees in 1908, it stated that they "should be under the supervision of
the court, in order that clients be protected from unjust charges." 33 REPORTS OF AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 80 (1908) (adopting Canon 13 to the Canons of Ethics). Yet the need
for judicial supervision is far greater today than in 1908. Contingent fee rates have esca-
lated to the point that they often bear no relationship to the work to be performed or the
risk assumed by the attorney. Indeed, when measured in constant dollars, contingent fee
rates yield effective hourly rates of return that are five to eight times greater today than
25 years ago though the litigation risks borne by lawyers has declined significantly in
that interval. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra, at 101.
Although it has been demonstrated (1) that ethical rules and fiduciary law mandate
that contingent fees be used only when there are contingencies, i.e., when there is risk;
and (2) that if there is a realistic risk of nonrecovery, then the premium for assuming the
risk, i.e., the contingent fee, must be commensurate with the risk, see id. at 44-93, it is
clear that lawyers are routinely violating the ethical admonitions of the Model Rules, the
Model Code, and the correlative fiduciary right of clients not to be overreached in con-
tingent fee settings, see id. at 54. As a consequence of the judiciary's abdication of its
supervisory responsibility, the effective hourly rates of return from contingent fees in
cases in which little or no risk is borne by the attorney often can exceed $1000 per hour.
See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra, at 33 n.12; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Liti-
1040 [Vol. 43
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One fee matter in which success still eludes lawyers is the
nonrefundable retainer-a payment in advance to a lawyer for work to
be done later., Although generally unsuccessful in creating a special
rule-applicable only to lawyers-that would validate these contrac-
tual fee forfeiture provisions, some bar associations have issued opin-
ions that have gained the imprimatur of several bankruptcy courts for
their self-interested efforts to legitimate these professionally irrespon-
sible fees.9
These efforts are part of a broader assault by lawyers on societal
attempts to regulate their fees in bankruptcy proceedings. Not content
with having surmounted fee restraints, ° lawyers are seeking to use ad-
vance fee retainers to have their fees, and their fees only, exempted
from the scrutiny of the bankruptcy courts. This Article critically ex-
amines such efforts.
Attorney fees paid from the bankruptcy estate are subject to regu-
lation under the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, and dis-
bursements from the estate for attorney fees are carefully supervised
by the bankruptcy courts." In reaction to these statutorily imposed
procedures, the bankruptcy bar has posited several strategies to liber-
ate attorney fees from the ambit of the Bankruptcy Code's fee applica-
tion process and thus escape the scrutiny of the bankruptcy courts.
The dominant thread in these efforts has been the attorney's at-
tempt to obtain fees for postpetition services before filing the debtor's
petition for bankruptcy. 2 Once a petition is filed, all of the debtor's
equitable and legal property interests are transformed into a new and
gation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
1819, 1835 n.61 (1992); Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Fee Frenzy, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,
1991, at A29.
8. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 150-51 & n.1.
9. See cases cited infra note 16.
10. See infra notes 36-68 and accompanying text.
11. In a variety of situations, the Bankruptcy Code imposes on the judge the
responsibility of measuring the propriety of the parties' fee requests. Other
courts have this responsibility in some cases, but the important point may be
the shift in the balance: in the ordinary case, control over fees may be the
exception, while in bankruptcy it is the rule.
John D. Ayer, How To Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 Am. BANKR. LJ. 355, 398
(1986).
12. The bankruptcy courts have held that only an attorney and not a lay person
may file a petition for bankruptcy court protection when the debtor is not a natural
person (for example, a corporation). In re Bellerive Springs Bldg. Corp., 127 B.R. 219,
220 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991). Filing a petition for bankruptcy court protection is the prac-
tice of law and may be accomplished only by a duly licensed attorney. In re Video Sys.
Design & Sales, Inc., 129 B.R. 196, 196 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); see also In re Global
Constr. & Supply, Inc., 126 B.R. 573 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that the filing of a
bankruptcy petition by a nonlawyer was the unauthorized practice of law).
1992] 1041
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separate legal entity: the bankruptcy estate. The statutory scheme laid
out by Congress in the bankruptcy fee application procedure ensures
that attorney fees paid from the bankruptcy estate are prudential.
However, by requiring payment from the debtor prior to filing the peti-
tion for bankruptcy, attorneys receive their fees prior to the genesis of
the bankruptcy estate. In this way, the attorney seeks to avoid the fee
application process. If this method is successful, then merely through
their own agreement, the attorney and the debtor can unilaterally
redefine the property interests of the bankruptcy estate.
This Article argues that advance fees paid by the debtor on the
eve of bankruptcy cannot escape the scrutiny of the bankruptcy courts,
must be deposited in the attorney's client security account, and cannot
be denominated as nonrefundable. It further argues that actions to the
contrary are illegal because they violate fiduciary law, unethical be-
cause they are contrary to the Model Code of Professional.Responsibil-
ity and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, violative of the pro-
visions and policies of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 13 and at
odds with the public policies of both the states and the federal
government.
The use of advance fees in bankruptcy to avoid the statutory fee
application process is nothing less than professional hegemony. Au-
thored by bar associations,14 advocated by the bankruptcy bar,' and
recently sanctioned by some bankruptcy courts,' attorneys have.
sought to elevate their interests above those of the intended benefi-
ciaries of the bankruptcy process: the estate and its creditors.
This Article is intended to deliver a coup de grace to these nascent
efforts to create another special rule for lawyers that circumvents both
the letter and spirit of the Bankruptcy Code.
Part II of this Article is a brief primer on bankruptcy law as it
pertains to bankruptcy fees. Part III examines the evolution of the
bankruptcy attorney fee application process and how it operates to ef-
fectuate the broader goals of the Bankruptcy Code: a fresh start for the
debtor 17 and creditor protection. Part IV outlines the mechanics of the
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
14. The bankruptcy bar has relied on and cited to state bar association ethics opin-
ions as authority in its attempts to legitimate prepetition payments from clients. See
infra text accompanying notes 151-67, 235-58.
15, Jeffrey Krause, Treatment of Prepetition Retainers, 17 CAL. BANKR. J. 153
(1989).
16. See In re In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); McDonald
Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
17.. E.g., In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1989); Eric W. Sleeper, Recent
Development, Discharge: Sections 727, 524 and 523; 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 115, 115 (1985)
(citing Slocum v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 38 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984)).
[Vol. 431042
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Bankruptcy Code's fee application process. Part V presents an over-
view of general and special attorney retainer agreements including: (1)
advance fee payments, (2) nonrefundable retainers, and (3) security re-
tainers. Part VI examines the use of these various retainers in the
bankruptcy context and then critically examines two recent cases that,
through legal legerdemain, seek to create another special rule that ben-
efits attorneys by sanctioning the use of advance payment retainers in
a manner that insulates them from the Bankruptcy -Code's fee applica-
tion process.
II. BANKRUPTCY LAW: A PRIMER
A. Purpose of the Bankruptcy Laws
Congress's objective in enacting the Bankruptcy Act of 189818 (the
Act) and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197819 was to give debtors a
fresh start while protecting the interests of unsecured creditors.20 This
idea was novel when the first Bankruptcy Act was passed and is still
unique in the world. Under this bankruptcy law schema, insolvent
debtors are not left to strain under the yoke of their debts for the rest
of their lives.21 Instead, debtors can petition 2 the United States Bank-
18. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
19. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current
version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and created the current Bankruptcy Code,
which became effective on October 1, 1979.
20. Krohn, 886 F.2d at 127-28 (" 'The goals of bankruptcy are to provide an honest
debtor with a fresh start and to provide for an equitable distribution to creditors.' ")
(quoting bankruptcy court opinion, 78 B.R. 829, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)); see also
Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (recognizing the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Code).
21. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)
(" 'Having to live the rest of his life with a significant judgment which would forever
accrue interest and result in endless garnishments against his wages and keep him from
accumulating any property would be inimical to such a fresh start.' ") (quoting bank-
ruptcy court opinion, No. 4-87-104, slip op. at 13 (Bankr. Minn. Nov. 12, 1987)), reo'd en
banc, 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990).
22. A debtor who seeks bankruptcy court relief is deemed to have filed a "volun-
tary petition." 18 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). The bankruptcy court also protects unsecured
creditors from both the debtor and rival creditors. When creditors of an insolvent indi-
vidual or entity file a bankruptcy petition against a debtor, it is deemed an "involuntary
petition." Id. § 303. The bankruptcy court supervises the bankruptcy estate to protect
the creditors' and the debtor's interests. Judicial supervision reduces the chance of credi-
tor loss due to fraud or mismanagement by the debtor. Bankruptcy also diminishes the
incentive for creditors to race to the courthouse to collect their debts because the Code
mandates the priority in which creditors can be paid. See, e.g., id. §§ 362, 506-509, 725,
1992] 1043
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ruptcy Court for protection from their creditors under the Bankruptcy
Code while they attempt to reorganize their businesses.
2 3
B. Voiding Preferences of One Creditor over Those of Others
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code24 seeks to treat all unsecured
creditors equally in a bankruptcy proceeding by allowing the trustee to
avoid, as an unlawful preference, 25 any transfer of an interest in the
726.
23. If the bankruptcy reorganization plan is successful, the debtor will have rees-
tablished its business and satisfied its creditor's claims under a court-approved plan. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129, 1321-1330 (1988). If the reorganization fails, the case may be
converted from a bankruptcy reorganization to a bankruptcy liquidation. Id. §§ 1112,
1307. An individual debtor with regular income will most likely attempt to file Chapter
13 bankruptcy, id. § 109(e), although such a debtor is not precluded from reorganizing
under Chapter 11. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S, Ct. 2197 (1991). Under the Bankruptcy
Code's liquidation provisions, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988), a trustee will supervise the
orderly liquidation of the bankruptcy estate's remaining assets, which will be applied
towards the satisfaction of any outstanding claims against the debtor's estate. A debtor
may file for Chapter 7 relief without first attempting to reorganize under Chapters 11 or
13, See id. § 109(a)-(b).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). This section is a brief sketch of the applicable bank-
ruptcy law in simplified form.
25. The trustee must show that a transfer meets five conditions before it can be
deemed a preference and avoided.
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; [Section 547(f) creates a rebuttable presumption that the
debtor was insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately pre-
ceding the petition date] and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U,S.C. § 547(b) (1988). Section 547(b) is the operative provision of § 547. Section
547(c) contains three exceptions to the general rule of § 547(b). Transfers coming under
these exceptions cannot be set aside by the trustee as voidable preferences. Section
547(g) places the burden of proving avoidability under § 547(b) on the trustee and the
burden of proving nonavoidability under § 547(c) on the creditor. Section 547(a) contains
1044 [Vol. 43
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debtor's property that would put one creditor in a better position than
another.26
C. Priority of Claims in Bankruptcy Estate Liquidation
In drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress established the order
of priority in which creditors' claims are to be satisfied from the bank-
ruptcy estate upon its liquidation." Under this schema claims against
the debtor are grouped into classes for different treatment. Secured
claims2 are paid first.29 Assets that remain are distributed pro rata to
satisfy unsecured claims.
Within the class of unsecured claims, Congress has determined
that some should be satisfied ahead of others and has selected eight
types of unsecured claims for priority status.30 They are, from highest
to lowest priority 3': (1) Administrative expenses, section 507(a) (1)32;
(2) Involuntary case gap claims, section 507(a)(2)33; (3) Wages, salaries,
or commissions, section 507(a)(3); (4) Contributions to an employee
benefit plan, section 507(a)(4); (5) Claims of grain farmers and United
States fishermen, section 507(a)(5); (6) Consumer layaway claims, sec-
tion 507(a)(6); (7) Unsecured prepetition taxes, section 507(a)(7); and
(8) Claims necessary to maintain the capital of an insured depository
definitions of the terms "inventory," "new value," and "receivable," as they are to be
understood for § 547's purposes. Id. § 547(a)(1)-(3).
26. Although preferring one creditor over another is perfectly acceptable in a
nonbankruptcy proceeding, it is prohibited retroactively once a bankruptcy petition is
filed.
27. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 725, 726 (1988). See generally John C. Levy, The Priority
Provisions, 1 BANKR. Dv. J. 282 (1984) (analyzing the priority provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
28. If the value of the collateral is insufficient to satisfy a secured claim, then the
unsatisfied portion becomes an unsecured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
29. Id. § 725; In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821, 824 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)
(holding that secured creditor's claim to collateral is superior even to first priority claim-
ants, including attorney fees).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1988) (referring to § 507).
31. To a large extent each priority claim's relative position and the fact that a
particular class of claims has a priority at all is a reflection of the favored class of claim-
ants' lobbying efforts and political power in Washington. For example, Senator Robert J.
Dole, whose home state of Kansas boasts many grain farmers, was influential in elevating
the claims of grain farmers to priority status. See 130 CONG. REc. 20,083 (1984) (state-
ment of Sen. Dole).
32. Only the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate" are
granted a first priority. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
33. Gap claims are claims that arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's business
after an involuntary petition is filed, but before a trustee is appointed or an order for
relief is granted. Id. § 502(f).
1992] 1045
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institution, section 507(a)(8).3 4 Claims of the highest priority, termed
"administrative expenses," include all costs of administering the bank-
ruptcy estate postpetition, including attorney fees incurred by the es-
tate.35 Therefore, attorneys (and other professionals) employed by the
bankruptcy estate have a first priority claim among the unsecured
creditors.
III. HISTORY OF REGULATION OF ATTORNEY FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Regulation of Attorney Fees in the New World 31
Perhaps the first attempt in the New World to regulate attorney
fees occurred in 1658 when Peter Stuyvesant, in response to abuses
alleged to have been committed by various court officers, prohibited
lawyers from charging excessive fees.37 Stuyvesant's proclamation was
said to have reduced the fees charged for various legal services from
34. Id. § 507(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The trustee begins the distribution of
claims with priority by first satisfying all claims in the highest priority class. Only then
may the claims from the next class of priority creditors be satisfied. As each class of
claims is satisfied in full, the trustee then proceeds to the next subordinate class of
claims. If there are insufficient assets to satisfy all the claimants in a given class, then
each claimant is paid a pro rata share of what remains and the subordinate classes of
claimants receive nothing. Id. § 726(b) (1988).
The general unsecured claims are subordinated to all eight priority unsecured
claims. Id. § 726(a)(2)-(4). Although this is the numerical schema of priorities, Congress
has allowed two types of claimants to come ahead of all eight enumerated classes of
priority claimants. If a secured creditor is given adequate protection for a lien under
§ 362, 363, or 364, but the adequate protection ultimately proves deficient, the creditor
will receive an administrative claim senior to all other administrative priority claims.
Id. § 507(b). This is called a superpriority. See In re Colter, Inc., 53 B.R. 958 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985); In re Callister, 15 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (stating that administra-
tive expenses include attorney fees, but they are inferior in priority to superpriorities),
appeal dismissed sub. nom. Callister v. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Callister), 673
F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1982). See generally Smith v. Dairymen, Inc. (In re Smith), 75 B.R.
365 (W.D. Va. 1987) (discussing the requirements to obtain a superpriority claim). Some-
times the bankruptcy estate is strapped for cash and the trustee cannot find a lender
willing to lend money postpetition on an unsecured basis. In such cases the bankruptcy
court can, in return for new credit or debt, give the lender's claim priority over all other
administrative claims, even a superpriority claim. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988).
36. Parts of this section on the history of attorney fees in Colonial America rely on
an unpublished research paper prepared by Kenneth Churin, J.D., 1991, Cardozo School
of Law,
37. See 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 458
(1906) (" 'It is then provided that the officers enumerated shall serve the poor gratis for
God's sake, but may take from the wealthy the fee specified.' ") (quoting proclamation
issued by Peter Stuyvesant).
1046 [Vol. 43
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/11
RETAINER AGREEMENTS
fifty to eighty-five percent .3
Although the original English laws in the Colony of New York (the
Duke's Laws) made no particular reference to attorney fees, by 1693
the New York Colonial Assembly had published a catalogue of fees.
3 9
However, attorneys usually ignored the catalogue, and their charges
generally exceeded the published amounts.40 As a result, the Assembly
promulgated another act in 1709 that not only reestablished a fee
schedule but also required severe punishments for law yers who charged
in excess of the prescribed amounts.41 However, the bar exerted such
enormous pressure on the colonial government that the Act was re-
pealed in December of the same year.42 In 1710 the governor and coun-
cil issued yet another ordinance regulating attorney fees, and this act,
with minor alterations, remained in effect until 1768.' 3
Interestingly, the 1710 act raised fees only slightly above the rates
authorized by the 1709 act.44 Apparently, the only significant difference
between the two acts was the omission from the 1710 act of the severe
penalty provisions. Presumably, without a penalty provision, lawyers
could safely ignore the act.45 The bar's exercise of its power to force a
change in the 1709 act46 was merely a precursor of things to come.
47
38. 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
153 (1965).
39. Id. at 159.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 159-60 ("That if any Lawyer Or Attorney shall take or Exact any more or
other fees than is Limited in This Act or Refuse to Serve any person for the aforesaid
Fees not being Retained by the adverse party Shall fforfeit Fifty pounds Currant money
of this Colony and for Ever be Debarred from Practising in any Court within This Col-
ony.' ") (quoting I COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 1638-53, at 653 (1894)).
42. Id. at 160.
43. Id.
44. Id. The 1709 statute allowed a maximum of fifty shillings while the 1710 stat-
ute allowed a maximum of four pounds.
45. "Disregard of law was commonplace in the eighteenth century, when govern-
ments freely enacted general legislation without succeeding in or even caring about en-
forcement in particular cases . . . . [Tihe British Americans were possibly the least law
abiding of all the more civilized European peoples." R. R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A
HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 324 (2d ed. 1962).
46. The bar's political power may have been a result of the unique conditions in
eighteenth century New York when there were apparently few practicing attorneys in
relation to the degree of commercial activity in the colony. The bar may have created
this shortage to put upward pressure on fees. As early as 1695 an act was passed that
prohibited a litigant from hiring more than two attorneys because the litigant could oth-
erwise "fee" or hire all of the available attorneys and deprive the opponent of counsel.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 87 (1973). In 1729 a group of New
York lawyers formed an association "to supervise legal education, regulate practice, and
control admission to the bar." Id. In 1756 they agreed not to take on any clerks (the
method by which one learned the law and gained admittance to the bar) for the next
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Lawyers in the other colonies also were beset by societal attempts
to regulate their fees and also were quite successful in resisting those
efforts. In 1787, after years of antilawyer sentiment on the part of the
public, the Massachusetts Legislature twice tried and twice failed to
pass an iron-clad fee schedule.4 8 In 1777 Pennsylvania installed a new
fee schedule that, because of inflation, doubled the fees previously set
in 1752.40 There is considerable evidence, however, that even the new
fee schedule was not effective in regulating lawyers' fees.50
When New York emerged as a state, it did so replete with laws
regulating lawyers' fees. Through 1813 these fee bills, as they were
called, prescribed the total compensation to which a lawyer was enti-
tled. These included proscriptions on attorney-client contract rates
("fees") and the litigation costs recoverable by the winning party
("costs"). 1 Thus, the fee bill statutes purported to declare that the
specified recoverable costs were the full measure of the lawyer's com-
pensation. 2 Post-1823 New York fee bills did not seek to control what
courts could allow as recoverable costs, but did prescribe what fees at-
torneys could charge their clients.
5 3
Despite express statements in the fee bills that lawyers could not
charge their clients more than the statutorily authorized amount, law-
fourteen years, except for their sons. Id.
47. See Robert S. England, Congress, Nader, and the Ambulance Chasers, AM.
SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, at I.
48. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876,
at 56 (1976).
49. 2 CIROUST, supra note 38, at 257.
50. Despite the statute, the governor of Pennsylvania required in 1792 that:
[A1ll attorneys "entitled to demand or receive fees" were required to "transmit
to the governor of the commonwealth a particular statement of the several ser-
vices for which they are entitled to demand and receive fees ... and of the
fees ... which they respectively charge and receive ... for the performance of
their respective duties, together with the several particulars."
Id. (quoting ch. 1648, § 1, 14 STATUTES AT LARGE: OF PENNSYLVANIA 1682-1801, at 329
(1909)).
The purpose of this demand was to allow the legislature to collect reliable data
about the actual fees that attorneys were charging so that it could draft a new, and
perhaps more realistic, act for regulating fees. Id. The lawmakers must have concluded
that the prior regulations were not being observed. If the fee regulations were being seri-
ously enforced, then the legislature need not have asked attorneys what they were actu-
ally charging for their various services. They need have consulted only the established
schedule.
51. See 1813 N.Y. Laws ch. 83 ("[N]o officer ... shall exact, demand or ask, or be
allowed any fee greater than prescribed.").
52. See Davenport v. Ludlow, 4 How. Pr. 337, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (referring
to function of fee bills prior to repeal).
53. See, e.g., 1840 N.Y. Laws, ch. 386, §§ 1-4, at 11-41.
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yers in fact did precisely that. In Adams v. Stevens & Cagger54 the
court stated:
It is supposed, however, that as the fee-bill has fixed certain al-
lowances for counsel fees, no greater compensation than is there speci-
fied can be recovered as between solicitor and client. But such has not
been the construction of the law of this State, fixing a tariff of fees
from time to time. The counsel fees specified in the statute have al-
ways been considered as merely fixing the rate of allowance of taxable
costs, as between party and party. . . . The language of the former
fee bills of 1789, of 1801 and of 1813, was much stronger than that
which is contained in the Revised Statutes. . . . The courts, however,
did not consider that as limiting the amount which the counsel was to
receive from his own client, for trying or arguing his cause."5
The court continued:
[W]here a party employs counsel, and agrees to give him a specific
allowance for his services, or to pay him what those services shall be
reasonably worth, I think, by the laws of this State, the counsel thus
employed may receive from his own client a compensation beyond the
nominal counsel fee specified in the fee bill, without subjecting him-
self to indictment for a misdemeanor, or rendering himself liable to
the penalty of treble damages to the client . . ..
In addition to disregarding the fee bills, lawyers also responded to
the fee restraints in other ways. For example, the fee bills stated that a
lawyer could charge two dollars for "[p]erusing and amending interrog-
atories" and one dollar for "[d]rawing a demurrer or joinder in de-
murrer."5 Thus, lawyer income became a function of court filings and
"the prominence and practice of a lawyer was judged by the number of
writs he sued out, or to which he appeared."5 9 Because a lawyer's com-
pensation depended on "the number or length of the proceedings,""0
the fee bills encouraged "multiplication of the processes."" The
54. 26 Wend. 451 (N.Y. 1841).
55. Id. at 455-56.
56. Id. at 457. The two concurring opinions were even more emphatic. The concur-
rence of Senator Lee, an associate justice, stated, "In an experience of some forty years
with the practice of the courts, I have never known counsel, in their claims on their
clients, limited to the fee bill." Id. at 458. The concurrence of Senator Verplank, an
associate justice, was a tour de force of construing away the plain meaning of the words
of the fee bill. See id. at 461-66.
57. 1840 N.Y. Laws, ch. 386, § 2.
58. Id. § 3.
59. HENRY W. ScoTr, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 217-18 (1909).
60. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, NEW YORK
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proliferation of proceedings that ensued coupled with the inordinate
procedural complexities that resulted from the dual systems of equity
and law, which often denied meritorious claimants victory because of
their archaic insistence on obsolete formalisms,62 culminated in the
Field Code of 1848.63
The Field Code abrogated the fee bill system"4 and declared:
All statutes establishing or regulating the costs or fees of attorneys,
solicitors and counsel in civil actions, and all existing rules and provi-
sions of law, restricting or controlling the right of a party to agree
with an attorney, solicitor or counsel, for his compensation, are re-
pealed; and hereafter the measure of such compensation shall be left
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.6 5
Thereafter, attorney fee regulation shifted to fiduciary concerns.
This shift culminated in rules that allow clients to discharge retained
lawyers in whom they have lost trust and confidence without incurring
contract damages6 and efforts to control rampant overreaching in con-
tingent fee practice.6 7 Like the fee bills, however, these modern regula-
tions have atrophied substantially.6
B. Attorney Fee Regulation in Bankruptcy
1. Attorney Fees for Representing a Debtor in Bankruptcy Have
Received Greater Scrutiny than Attorney Fees for Other Services
One area of fee regulation that has not atrophied, but rather has
been periodically renewed, is attorney fees in bankruptcy. This area
has evolved into a set of strong and tightly monitored rules. The legis-
lative attention given to bankruptcy fee regulation is due to three
factors.
62. FLEMING JAMES. JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 17-18
(3d ed. 1985).
63. See FIRST REPORT, supra "note 60, at 204.
64. David Dudley Field strongly disfavored state regulation of lawyers' fee. Id. at
204-05. However, repealing the fee bills also may have served another goal. Because law-
yers had invested heavily in the formalistic pleading system and would have had to
devote considerable time to learning a new pleading system, many no doubt opposed
Field's proposal. It is possible that the price for their political acquiescence was the abo-
lition of the fee bills.
65. 1848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 379, tit. 10, § 258.
66. See Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contin-
gent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367 (1992).
67. See supra note 7.
68. See Brickman, supra note 66, at 382-92; Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle,
supra note 7, at 1423-30.
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a. The Vesting of the Bankruptcy Power at the National Level
Historically, attorney fees have been regulated by the colonial gov-
ernments and their successors, the sovereign states. These regulatory
attempts have been intermittent and generally unsuccessful.6 9 How-
ever, the national government regulates attorney fees in bankruptcy
pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority to "establish . . . uni-
form Laws 0 on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States."' Although as of 1788 the Constitution authorized Congress to
enact a national bankruptcy law, 2 it was not until 1898 that the first
bankruptcy statute of longstanding duration was enacted.7 3 That legis-
lation has become known as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, or just the
"Act."
b. The Unique Purposes of the United States Bankruptcy Statutes
The United States bankruptcy schema serves two major societal
purposes. First, because the debtor may have its debts discharged and
assume a fresh economic start, the debtor can resume its position as a
functional cog in the economic wheel of our economy. Second, the pro-
tection of each creditor's interests from both the debtor and rival cred-
itors strengthens the economy's credit system. Thus, although the gen-
eral purpose of attorney fee regulation is to protect the client, in this
69. See supra part III(A).
70. The importance of uniform bankruptcy laws to the framers of the Constitution
is evidenced by the inclusion of the bankruptcy power-directly after the commerce
clause and prior to the power to coin money-in the brief list of enumerated powers
granted to the national government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-5; cf. Thomas M. Clark,
Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of Congressional
Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1038-39 (1988)
(stating that the bankruptcy clause is one of Congress's limited powers to abrogate state
law).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. In those periods when our nation had no national
bankruptcy law, state insolvency laws filled the void. However, national bankruptcy laws,
once adopted, became preeminent over state insolvency laws. See Note, Effect of Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act on State Insolvency Statutes, 49 YALE L.J. 1090 (1940).
72. The Constitution became legally effective upon the signing of the ninth state,
New Hampshire, on June 21, 1788. MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS xxvi (1973).
73. Congress was slow to exercise its authority and enact a national bankruptcy
statute. When it finally did so, in 1800, the Act was short-lived; Congress repealed it in
1803. In fact, federal bankruptcy laws were in effect for only 15 years of our nation's first
century. The three bankruptcy acts during this time were: Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2
Stat. 19 (repealed 1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). None of these statutes directly ad-
dressed attorney fees. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1 n.2.
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case the debtor,1 4 the bankruptcy schema is designed to protect credi-
tors-third parties to the attorney-debtor contract-both from the
usual menace of attorney overreaching as well as from debtors who
might deal too liberally with their attorneys in an attempt to stave off
creditors.
c. The Political Power and Organizational Skill of the Group Most
Affected by the Bankruptcy Statutes: Creditors
The large stake creditors have in keeping the bankruptcy process
efficient-to allow greater recovery for themselves-has resulted in
their coordination of efforts to influence national bankruptcy
legislation.7
5
2. Level of Compensation from the Bankruptcy Estate: Balancing
Conservation of the Bankruptcy Estate with Attracting a
Competent Bar
a. Attorney Fees Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,76 courts were parsimonious in
their awards of attorney fees.77 Indeed, the history of attorney fee regu-
lation in bankruptcy is the saga of an ever-evolving struggle between
two competing interests: (1) conserving the bankruptcy estate to allow
the debtor a fresh start and creditors a maximum recovery, and (2)
sufficiently compensating those who administer the estate-principally
attorneys-to maintain a competent corps of bankruptcy profession-
als.78 Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the protection of the interests
74. See Dorr, Cooper & Hays v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far E. Line, Inc.), 644 F.2d
1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 1981); In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 687-88 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1988).
75. For example, three prominent consumer credit trade groups: the American Fi-
nancial Services Association, the American Bankers Association, and the Consumer
Bankers Association, each of which is in itself an amalgamation of numerous creditors,
combined with other creditors to form the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition to
more effectively lobby Congress for procreditor reforms of the Bankruptcy Code. Paul
Starobin, Distressed Debtors, 23 NAT'L J. 2468, 2471 (1991). The National Consumer
Bankruptcy Coalition currently is lobbying Congress to prohibit personal debtors from
filing under Chapter 7 if they can meet a Chapter 13 debt-repayment plan. Id.
76, An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
77. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g.,'Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc. (In re Beverly
Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc.), 548 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1976). Attorneys phrase their
interest not in terms of satisfying their needs for compensation but rather in terms of
1052 [Vol. 43
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of creditors and the public was preeminent, and courts awarded com-
pensation to bankruptcy professionals, including attorneys, in light of
that objective. 9 In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Brock,"' a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court
discussed the reasons for its prudence in the awarding of attorney fees.
The public interest which is inherent in bankruptcy matters must be
considered in awarding fees. The object is to draw a balance to the
end that competent trustees and counsel are obtainable in matters of
this kind because of the knowledge that they will be fairly compen-
sated. They must not and cannot expect, however, to be overcompen-
sated, for the court must exercise its discretion for the double purpose
of fairly treating the trustee and his counsel while at the same time
doing equity to the debtor and creditors." '
attracting a competent bar for the benefit of both debtors and creditors. The ubiquitous
view in the literature that advocates liberalizing the attorney payment schema for bank-
ruptcy work is that, because of inadequate compensation, competent bankruptcy attor-
neys had or were about to abandon bankruptcy work. The inescapable conclusion,
though not stated forthrightly in the literature, is that no attorneys, or only incompetent
attorneys, would be left to handle bankruptcy work. Therefore, the efficiency of the en-
tire bankruptcy process was at stake.
No reliable empirical data exists to support this conclusion. Indeed, one recent study
of the bankruptcy bar noted: "Even while the Bankruptcy Reform Act was debated in
Congress, no one had even a sound estimate of the number of lawyers practicing in the
bankruptcy courts, how they were distributed across the country, how specialized their
practices were, or what kinds of clients they represented." Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice, 63 AM. BANK. L.J. 289, 290 n.6 (1989).
While the bar seeks to bring to the attention of Congress and the public the danger
of not compensating bankruptcy attorneys at the rate they could receive for doing
nonbankruptcy work, it is interesting to note that the federal rules that govern the com-
pensation of physicians who treat Medicare patients provide for a physician's fee that is
less than that which a physician could earn if the physician treated nonMedicaid pa-
tients. No More Smoke and Mirrors-Deficit Reduction Takes on Real Taxes and Real
Cuts, SEATTLE NEwS , Oct. 2, 1990, at A8 (editorial). There are several possible reasons
for this discrepancy: (1) competent doctors are more likely to work for below-market
wages than competent attorneys, (2) Congress believes that the protection of a debtor's
right to competent legal counsel is more fundamental than a Medicaid recipient's right
to competent medical care, (3) lawyers are better lobbyists than doctors, or (4) more
lawyers than doctors serve in Congress.
79. Presumably it is in the public interest to promote efficient bankruptcy adminis-
tration because it minimizes creditor losses and speeds the debtor's transition to a pro-
ductive member of society. Scant attention has been given, however, to the study of the
purposes of the bankruptcy power. "Bankruptcy scholars have been content to recite,
without critical analysis, the two normative objectives of bankruptcy: rehabilitation of
overburdened debtors and equality of treatment for creditors and other claimants."
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155 (1989).
80. 405 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
81. Id. at 432-33.
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Despite the amount of effort an attorney expends in representing a cli-
ent in bankruptcy, the attorney's total compensation under the Act
would have to bear some relationship to the size of the bankruptcy
estate that the attorney seeks to maximize.8 2
Courts strove to come up with a general rule for determining what
maximum amount of compensation an attorney should receive from
the estate. One frequently cited yardstick was the annual salary of a
federal district court judge.83 The rationale for this standard was that
the attorney was working as a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate and,
"being regarded as (a] public servant[]," should not expect to be paid
the usual rate charged to private clients.84 Additionally, the Act per-
mitted payment to attorneys only at the conclusion of a case.85
Other fee regulation aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, partic-
ularly the fee disclosure and fee application provisions, have been re-
fined over the past century and incorporated into the current Bank-
ruptcy Code. The 1898 Act authorized bankruptcy courts to reexamine
attorney fees paid by debtors in anticipation of bankruptcy. If the fees
paid were intended to compensate the attorney for legal services to be
performed in the future, a creditor could petition the court to reexam-
ine the transaction. If the court found that the fee exceeded a reasona-
ble amount, it could order that the excess be refunded to the estate."6
82, "[Iln a reorganization proceeding, where the lawyers look for compensation
to the debtor's estate which may belong, in equity, largely to others than those
who have requested their services, they should have in mind the fact that the
total aggregate of fees must bear some reasonable relation to the estate's value.
Under these circumstances they cannot always expect to be compensated at
the same rate as in litigation of the usual kind . .. ."
Id. at 433 (quoting Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1950)).
83, Official Creditors' Comm. of Fox Mkts., Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461, 465-66 (9th
Cir. 1964) (citing Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 106 (1922)) (stating that
the salary of a federal district court judge is a relevant factor in determining the reasona-
bleness of compensation to an attorney), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965).
84. York Int'l Bldg., Inc. v. Chaney (In re York Int'l Bldg., Inc.), 527 F.2d 1061,
1069 (9th Cir. 1975).
85. This forced attorneys and their law firms to finance overhead and other costs
associated with bankruptcy work until the end of the case, which could last months or
years, and there was never any certainty that the bankrupt estate would have sufficient
assets to cover these costs. To circumvent this risk, attorneys sought to receive at least a
part of their fee in advance. See Susan R. Boyle, Economic Conditions Lead to Innova-
tion in Practice; Care is Used to Avoid Fee Fights, CRAIN'S CH. Bus., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1.
86. The original attorney compensation regulation, adopted in 1898, read:
If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing of a peti-
tion by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney and
counselor at law, solicitor in equity, or proctor in admiralty for services to be
rendered, the transaction shall be reexamined by the court on petition of the
trustee or any creditor and shall only be held valid to the extent of a reasona-
ble amount to be determined by the court, and the excess may be recovered by
[Vol. 43
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Congress amended the Act in 1968 to give the court authority: (1)
to reexamine attorney fees paid by a debtor for work previously per-
formed, if done in anticipation of bankruptcy, and (2) to reexamine, on
its own motion, attorney fees for both past and future services."1 The
1968 amendment, in addition to expanding the court's authority to
scrutinize fee payments, also authorized the court to reexamine the fee
agreement and to strike it if unreasonable.ss
b. Attorney Fees Under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
The Bankruptcy Act was repealed in 1978 and replaced by the
Bankruptcy Code. 9 The newly enacted Code legislatively liberalized
the attorney compensation scheme in three significant ways: (1) It in-
creased the rate of attorney compensation to market value, (2) it elimi-
nated the cap on total attorney compensation, and (3) it formally al-
lowed interim attorney compensation.
the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch.
541, § 60(d), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (1898) (repealed 1978).
87. The May 8, 1963 amendment substituted a new subsection as the operative
language of the Act in regulating attorney fees:
If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing of a peti-
tion by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law,
for services rendered or to be rendered, the transaction may be examined by
the court on its own motion or shall be examined by the court on petition of
the trustee or any creditor and shall be held valid only to the extent of a rea-
sonable amount to be determined by the court, and the excess may be recov-
ered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
If, whether before or after filing, a debtor shall agree orally or in writing to
pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law after the filing, the trans-
action may be examined by the court on its own motion or shall be examined
by the court on petition of the bankrupt made prior to discharge and shall be
held valid only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the
court, and any excess obligation shall be canceled, or if excess payment or
transfer has been made, returned to the bankrupt.
Act of May 8, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-17, 77 Stat. 14, 14-15 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96d
(Supp. V 1959-63)) (repealed 1978).
88. Id.
89. Bankruptcy Rules governing practice and procedure in Chapter XI cases
became effective in 1974, and rules applicable in Chapter X cases became ef-
fective in 1975. The Rules were promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075. The
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, and the Bankruptcy Rules were repealed
as of Oct. 1, 1979 by section 401 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
95-598, Tit. IV, sec. 401, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11-The Second Circuit
Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 295, 298 n.7
(1987). The Bankruptcy Code is currently codified as Title 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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First, the enactment of the Code overturned the rule of the Mas-
sachusetts Mutual case. The amount an attorney could earn for per-
forming bankruptcy services would now be that amount an attorney
would earn if performing comparable nonbankruptcy services, without
any reference to economy of the estate.90 Second, the judge-made rule
of Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (In re Beverly
Crest Convalescent Hospital, Inc.)91 also was overturned, thus elimi-
nating any caps on total attorney compensation for bankruptcy work.2
Finally, the Code included a provision that created a formal mecha-
nism for the compensation of attorneys on an interim basis, by applica-
tion to the court every 120 days, so that attorneys would not have to
wait for the conclusion of the case to receive compensation.9
Although Congress liberalized some aspects of attorney compensa-
tion in bankruptcy with the enactment of the Code, it carried forward
many of the fee strictures that evolved from the earlier Bankruptcy
Act. Principal among these are the Code's provisions for scrutinizing
prepetition fee agreements."4
90. Attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases can be quite large and should be closely
examined by the court. However bankruptcy legal services are entitled to com-
mand the same competency of counsel as other cases. In that light, the policy
of this section is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a
case under title 11 at the same rate as the attorney or other professional would
be compensated for performing comparable services other than in a case under
title 11. . . Notions of economy of the estate in fixing fees are outdated and
have no place in a bankruptcy code.
124 CONG. REc. 32,394-95,(1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)
(1988).
91. 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988); 124 CONG. REc. H11,901-02 (Sept. 28, 1978);
CONG. REc. S17,408 (Oct. 6, 1978); see also Boddy v. United States Bankruptcy Court (In
re Boddy), 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (establishing a fixed maximum fee for attor-
neys inconsistent with language of the Bankruptcy Code).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988) (stating that an attorney can apply for interim compen-
sation every 120 days during the case); BANKR. R. 2016(a).
94. Perhaps the Congress of 1978 feared the same type of human failing by the
fiduciaries of bankruptcy estates (i.e., overreaching) as the Congress of 1898 did. Thus,
the 1978 Congress may have decided that more than honor was still necessary to protect
the interests not only of the debtor, but also of creditors, and other third parties from
self-interested contracts between the attorney and debtor that were struck on the eve of
bankruptcy.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously
be lowered by any judgement of this court.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (citation omitted).
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Under the Code a prepetition agreement between a debtor and an
attorney is always subject to review by the court on its own motion or
on the motion of any party in interest.95 Moreover, an attorney who
seeks compensation from the bankruptcy estate carries the burden of
proving that the fee is "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services" that benefitted the estate."'
In addition, the Code has carried forward those provisions of the
Act that require an attorney to disclose the terms of any agreement
made with the debtor prior to petitioning for bankruptcy protection
and that come within the court's jurisdiction. In enacting section 329
of the Code, 7 which requires attorneys to disclose their compensation
agreements and allows the court to require attorneys to disgorge any
unreasonable fees, Congress was cognizant of the problems inherent in
allowing fiduciaries to set their own fees without court supervision. 8
95. BANKR. R. 2017.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988); see In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682,
686 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the burden of proof is on the party that re-
quests funds from the estate). "The compensation is to be reasonable, for actual neces-
sary services rendered, based on the time, the nature, the extent, and the value of the
services rendered, and on the cost of comparable services other than in a case under the
bankruptcy code." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 329-30 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988).
98. In In re Senior G & A Operating Co., 97 B.R. 307 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989), the
court discussed the history of the regulation of advance fees paid to a debtor's attorney
prior to bankruptcy and indicated that many of the disclosure requirements in the Code
originated in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.
Leiman v. Guttman squarely held that Section 221(4) applied even to "fees
incident to the reorganization but not payable out of the estate." Preferred
stockholders had escrowed shares to give their attorneys "additional compen-
sation" for their reorganization services. The Supreme Court reversed a bank-
ruptcy court holding that it had no power to determine the amount to be paid
under the agreement. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas reviewed the
history of Section 221 history [sic] and the evils it sought to remedy:
The control of the judge is not limited to fees and allowances payable
out of the estate. Section 221(4) places under his control "all payments
made or promised" (1) by "the debtor" or (2) "by a corporation issuing
securities or acquiring property under the plan" or (3) "by any other
person" for services rendered "in connection with" the proceeding or "in
connection with" the plan and "incident to" the reorganization. The ser-
vices of petitioners concededly met those requirements; and the commit-
tee against whom [sic] stock a lien is sought to be asserted would plainly
be included within the words "any other person". [sic] Moreover, these
petitioners are included in the classes of claimants to whom the judge is
empowered to allow reasonable compensation. To lift petitioner's claim
from Sec. 221(4) would therefore be to rewrite it or to hold that when
extended so far it was unconstitutional. The latter has not even been
intimated. The former is not permissible.
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Hence, it paid close attention to the need for careful supervision of
attorney fees.
This section, derived in large part from [former] Bankruptcy Act
The aim of the expanded controls over reorganization fees and expenses
is clear. The practice had been to fix them by private arrangement
outside of court. The deposit agreement under which committees com-
monly functioned was viewed as a private contract, which granted the
committee a lien on the deposited securities for its fees and expenses.
By terms of the agreement the committee was normally the sole judge of
their amount. This gave rise to serious abuses. There was the spectacle
of fiduciaries fixing the worth of their own services and exacting fees
which often had no relation to the value of services rendered. The result
was that the effective amount received by creditors and stockholders
under the plan was determined not by the court but by reorganization
managers and committees.
Hence Congress instituted controls, controls which became more perva-
sive as Sec. 77B was evolved into Ch. X. Section 211 requires that a
committee file with the court a statement disclosing specified informa-
tion including the agreement under which it operates. The scrutiny
clause of Sec. 212 gives the court power to set aside any of the provi-
sions of such an agreement which it finds to be "unfair or not consistent
with public policy". [sic] And Sec. 221(4) is written in pervasive
terms-it applies to "all payments" for services "in connection with" the
plan and "incident to" the reorganization, whoever pays for them.
Id. at 310 (citations omitted) (quoting Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1948)).
The Senior court further stated:
Just as a bankruptcy court cannot delegate fee review to another court or
agency, it cannot delegate fee review to the very persons whose fees would be
affected, or to their clients who are often uninformed or not in a position to
bargain. Attorneys will in the vast majority of instances strenuously attempt to
comport themselves with fairness. However, the judgement of our bankruptcy
laws is that it is too much humanly to expect that these professionals can be
entirely dispassionate judges of the value of their own services. Income not
only buys material goods and services, but also tends to have psychic value.
Some in our culture value themselves by how much they are paid, or view their
income as a measure of what hard-earned effort contributes to society or the
economy. Lawyers are not immune from powerful feelings such as these that
make the task of fee review difficult for both the judge and the professional
seeking fees.
The guaranty of the fees of attorneys for the Debtor may raise a question
as to whom the attorneys are actually representing. Counsel's duty of undi-
vided loyalty runs to the Debtor. That duty cannot be compromised by insid-
ers who guaranty compensation. Insiders have been known to make prepetition
transfers for personal benefit; to withdraw capital contributions under the
guise of repayment of personal loans made to the debtor; to satisfy debts guar-
anteed by them in preference to non-guaranteed obligations; and to transfer
business opportunities of a debtor to a new entity. By accepting a guaranty
from an insider, a debtor's counsel may have created a potential conflict of
interest.
Id. at 311 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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§ 60d, requires the debtor's attorney to file with the court a statement
of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid to the attorney for ser-
vices in contemplation of and in connection with the case, and the
source of the compensation. Payments to a debtor's attorney provide
serious potential for evasion of creditor protection provisions of the
bankruptcy laws, and serious potential for overreaching by the
debtor's attorney, and should be subject to careful scrutiny.9
3. The Current Issue of Bankruptcy Fees: Both the Bankruptcy
Bar and the Number of Bankruptcy Cases Filed Have Grown
Significantly Since the Enactment of the Code
Because of the vastly increased number of bankruptcy cases han-
dled today and because some of America's largest and best known com-
panies have recently filed bankruptcy, the issues surrounding attorney
fees in bankruptcy have become more prominent. Moreover, because of
the current cyclical downturn in the economy'00 and in part because of
a secular change in the way corporate America and the bankruptcy bar
have made use of the bankruptcy laws,0 1 the volume of bankruptcy
99. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6285; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5825.
100. Real estate values have substantially depreciated, buyers are scarce, and bank-
ers thus have had trouble in even establishing market prices. Adrienne Linsenmeyer,
The Worst Market Collapse in Decades, and Its Likely Repercussions, FIN. WORLD,
Nov. 12, 1991, at 26 ("[Hiow do you establish market value when there is no market?").
In 1991 two thirds of the wealth in the United States was in the form of real estate
holdings. Thus, the possibility of defaults on large real estate loan portfolios threatens
leading lending institutions and the United States economy. "Most of the big real estate
loans made by the banks will be coming due over the next three years, and the regulators
are pressuring the banks not to refinance them, but rather to take the hit immediately."
Id. The inability of debtors to obtain new financing on delinquent loans will, of course,
lead to more real estate loan defaults and a larger volume of bankruptcy filings.
101. For example, companies often use bankruptcy to (1) fend off tort claims and
(2) avoid the contractual obligations owed to their unions. There is an "increasing ten-
dency of companies to use the bankruptcy laws to cope with financial crises created by
labour, health or environmental problems." America's Corporate-Law Firms: LBO's Car-
rion Crows, Tim EcONOMIST, June 9, 1990, at 86.
Manville was besieged by product liability suits on behalf of-so far-152,000
claimed victims of diseases caused by its asbestos dust. The company's pros-
pects of survival were improved by a court-approved plan for it to set up a
trust fund to compensate victims. A similar settlement was reached when the
viability of A.H. Robins ... was threatened by the claims of women injured by
its Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. Continental Airlines used . . . the
bankruptcy laws to win a labour dispute. A big issue in the LTV case is
whether the company has to re-assume full liability for pension obligations
that were assumed by the government when the company was unable to fulfill
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filings has increased dramatically over the last decade.10' 2 This combi-
nation of increased attorney compensation for bankruptcy work and
the larger number of entities seeking bankruptcy protection at a time
of economic contraction and reduced corporate merger activity has led




Other possible reasons for the increased number of bankruptcies include easier
credit for consumers and greater public awareness of bankruptcy law and the protections
it offers to debtors. Mac Scott, Bankruptcy's New Chapters, ST. Louis Bus. J., Apr. 22,
1991, at lB.
102. United States bankruptcy filings increased from 331,098 in 1980 to 782,960 in
1990. Miles Maguire, Bankruptcy Buff Makes Book on Profiting From Others' Busts,
WASH. TumES, June 27, 1991, at C1. This increased volume of bankruptcy filings includes
some by the largest and best known companies in America: Eastern Air Lines, Pan Am,
Continental Airlines, Trans World Airlines, Greyhound, A.H. Robbins, LTV, Federated
Department Stores, R.H. Macy's, and Manville. These frequent filings have reduced the
stigma of bankruptcy, much as the stigma of divorce has diminished over the last two
decades. Ann K. Smith, The Bankruptcy Boom, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 4, 1990,
at 72. In addition, debtors find it easier to file under the new Code, and "life after bank-
ruptcy isn't always a credit-barren wasteland." Id. "Bankruptcy just doesn't mean what
it used to mean." Scott, supra note 101, at lB.
103. Law firms that formerly did not have a significant presence among the bank-
ruptcy bar have added or greatly expanded their bankruptcy departments since the 1978
enactment of the Code. This appears to be a reflection of the increased volume of the
business available and higher rates of return. "The new code also raised fees, making
Chapter 11 much more lucrative, and large firms were lured into the practice." Nina
Martin, Boom Times for Bankruptcy, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 83.
"[Tjhe recent tidal wave of bankruptcy work not only has strengthened the quality
of bankruptcy lawyers in Houston, but it also has stimulated dramatic growth in the
bankruptcy bar." Gary Taylor, Bankruptcy Work Means Black Gold for Houston Bar,
LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1983, at 1.
The large number of law firms that have committed resources and personnel to do
bankruptcy work has created a competitive environment in which bankruptcy attorneys
compete against each other to represent clients in bankruptcy-particularly creditors.
These contests have been termed "beauty contests," and the competition usually takes
place at the first meeting of creditors. "It's not unusual for ten to fifteen law firms to
show up and start elbowing each other .... Why at Carter Hawley Hale, there were
fifteen to twenty law firms lined up with their brochures." Susan Beck, The Anatomy of
a Beauty Contest, Am. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 46.
Clients have used them for years to choose counsel for all sorts of work. But
the bankruptcy arena generates a special breed of beauty contest. Unlike con-
tests conducted through discreet, select interviews, creditors committee con-
tests are, in fact, much like runway competitions. One after another, firms
parade in to strut their stuff before the judging panel .... It's somewhere
between a trip to the dentist and trying to sell your house."
Id. at 48 (quoting interview).
Law firms begin jockeying for position as soon as the petition for relief is filed.
"There's a great deal of jockeying going on (before the creditors committee
meeting] . . . . [F]irms try to line up "invitations" to the meeting or support
1060 [Vol. 43
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IV. THE MECHANICS OF PAYMENTS TO THE DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY
The mechanics of attorney' 04 compensation under the Code are
best understood by examining its six components.0 5 The first is disclo-
sure.106 The Code's disclosure requirements are extraordinarily strict
and contain harsh penalties for noncompliance. 0 7 The second and
third are application for and approval of employment, respectively.108
Although the debtor can negotiate an employment contract with an
attorney, in bankruptcy only a judge may approve an attorney's con-
tract for employment with the debtor in possession. Fourth, in order to
be paid, the attorney must submit a statement to the court that details
the work already performed.'0 9 Fifth, all payments to and agreements
with the debtor's attorney must be approved by the court."10 Finally,
the Code sets out strict requirements for determining the appropriate
level of compensation for attorneys who are paid out of estate funds."'
All of these rules were agreed upon as part of a legislative compro-
mise" 2 : balancing the creditors' interests in conserving the estate's as-
from large creditors. . . . "One thing people do is, as soon as the case is filed,
they absolutely run over [to the bankruptcy court] and get the list of the
twenty largest creditors and run that list through their computer of client
names to see if they have any contacts. They'll also send around a memo, say-
ing, 'If you know anybody at XYZ Company, let me know."'
Id. (some brackets in original) (quoting interview).
104. Because this Article concerns only the validity of prepetition asset transfers
from debtors to their attorneys, we refer here, and throughout this section, only to the
debtor's attorney, unless stated otherwise.
105. This is merely a sketch of the Bankruptcy Code's attorney payment mechanics
as set out in 11 U.S.C. §§ 326-330, Bankruptcy Rules 2014-2017, and other miscellaneous"
sections. See generally Steven J. Carney, Comment, Attorneys Fees in Bankruptcy, 19
GONZ. L. REv. 333 (1983-84) (discussing in detail the attorney fee provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988); BANKR. R. 2016.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988).
Proper and adequate notice is the most important element in all bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In the context of an employment application, such notice,
to be effective, requires disclosure. The disclosure must contain enough infor-
mation as will reasonably convey the information required by 11 U.S.C. §§ 327
and 329 and Bankruptcy Rules 2014 and 2016.
In re Automend, Inc., 85 B.R. 173, 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); see also In re Kero-Sun,
Inc., 58 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986) (denying compensation to debtor in possession's
court-approved attorney for failure to disclose under § 329 the source and proper amount
of fees received from major creditors).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1988); BANKR. R. 2014.
109. BANKR. R. 2016.
110. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328-329 (1988); BANKR. R. 4016.
111. 11 U.S.C. §§ 329(b), 330(a) (1988). This includes both prepetition and postpeti-
tion compensation if the payments are made with the debtor in possession's money.
112. "Section 330(a) contains the standard of compensation adopted in H.R. 8200 as
1992]
25
Brickman and Klein: The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sets against the attorneys' interests in receiving fair remuneration.
A. Disclosure Requirements
Under section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code 13 the trustee or debtor
in possession 114 is authorized to hire an attorney for the bankruptcy
estate. However, the trustee must seek court approval before hiring the
attorney.1 1 5 Moreover, the attorney must not have or represent any in-
terest adverse to the estate"1 and must be a "disinterested person."' 17
If at any time the court determines that an attorney is not a "disinter-
ested person," then it may deny the attorney compensation."" In addi-
passed by the House rather than the contrary standard contained in the Senate amend-
ment. Attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases can be quite large and should be closely ex-
amined by the court." 124 CONG. REc, 32,394 (1978).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1988).
114. The terms "debtor in possession" and "trustee" are used interchangeably in
this section. Both refer to the person charged by the bankruptcy court with overseeing
the administration of the bankruptcy estate.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988). Technically, attorneys who perform work prior to
getting court approval are not entitled to compensation for that work. In re F/S Airlease
II, Inc., 844 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1988). However, some bankruptcy courts have recently
shown flexibility and held that nunc pro tunc appointments of bankruptcy professionals
are within the bankruptcy court's equity power. Fanelli v. Hensley (In re Triangle
Chems., Inc.), 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1983).
116, 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (1988).
117. Id. § 327(a). The attorney selected cannot be a relative of the judge who will
have to approve the appointment; nor can the trustee hire a firm, partnership, or any
other business entity in any way associated with the judge. BANKR. R. 5002(a).
The term "disinterested person" is defined in the Code as follows:
"disinterested person" means person that-
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security
of the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the
petition, an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for
such an investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a
security of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment
banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph; and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the es-
tate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or
an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph,
or for any other reason.
Id, § 101(14) (Supp. 11 1990).
118. Id. § 328(c) (1988); see also Regina S. Kelbon et al., Conflicts, The Appoint-
ment of "Professionals," and Fiduciary Duties of Major Parties in Chapter 11, 8 BANKR.
DEv. J. 349, 357-74 (1991) (discussing case law on the "disinterested" requirement).
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tion, the trustee can be denied compensation for failing to make a dili-
gent inquiry into the facts surrounding an attorney's apparent conflict
of interest."1 9
After the petition is filed, an attorney who represents the debtor in
possession must file a statement with the court disclosing all compen-
sation "paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agreement was
made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition." ' 120 If
the court finds that the compensation received or to be received is ex-
cessive, it can order the agreement canceled and the consideration re-
turned to the payor-including a party other than the debtor.121
As noted in In re Senior G & A Operating Co.,1 22 the legislative
history of the Code evidences that Congress enacted these strict disclo-
sure requirements because of concern for attorney fees paid outside the
Code's creditor protection provisions. 123 Congress therefore gave bank-
ruptcy courts the authority to scrutinize attorney fees and the power to
reject them if they are unwise or unreasonable.
Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) implements the disclosure requirements
of section 329(a). It requires the attorney for the debtor to file a disclo-
sure document within fifteen days after the order for relief, and it re-
quires subsequent disclosures within fifteen days of any modifications
to the agreement or payments. The attorney also must disclose any fee
sharing agreement and the amounts involved.'2" Fee splitting also is
illegal.
1 25
B. Employment of Attorney
1. Application to Court for Employment
The trustee must apply to the court for an order approving the
employment of counsel. The application must contain the following:
(1) the facts showing the necessity of employment, (2) the name of the
attorney, (3) the reasons why the attorney was selected, (4) the services
119. 11 U.S.C. § 326(d) (1988).
120. Id. § 329(a).
121. Id. § 329(b).
122. 97 B.R. 307 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989).
123. Id. at 308-09.
124. BANKR. R. 2016(b).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199,
203 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that fee splitting is prohibited without prior court approval).
Congress intended that debtor's lawyers should not split fees. Lawyers should "'attend
to their duty as officers of the bankruptcy court.'" In re Matis, 73 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 504.02, at 504-8 to -9 (Lawrence P.
King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1986)).
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the attorney will render, (5) the proposed compensation agreement, (6)
all relationships that the attorney has with any parties in interest, and
(7) a verified statement from the attorney that discloses the attorney's
relationships with any party in interest and that party's professional
employees.
1 20
2. Court Approval of Employment
Once the trustee has submitted the attorney's name for approval
and the attorney has disclosed all necessary information, the court
must decide whether to approve the attorney's employment. No prior
agreement between the trustee and attorney is binding on the court. 12
The judge has sole discretion to decide the matter and can set any
reasonable terms of employment, including a retainer, a contingent fee,
or an hourly rate128 ; if the terms of employment eventually prove un-
wise because of unanticipated circumstances, the court can remake the
terms of employment. 129
C. Compensation of Attorney
1. Application for Compensation
Under the Bankruptcy Act an attorney had to wait until the case
was concluded to apply for compensation. Although case law under the
Act established some circumstances in which interim compensation
would be allowed, 1" 0 section 331 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code"' made
a dramatic change. Under section 331 an attorney can apply for in-
terim compensation for services already rendered once every 120
days.
32
When applying for either interim or final compensation, the attor-
ney must file a fee application with the court that complies with Rule
2016. The application should contain a detailed account of: (1) services
126. BANKR. R. 2014.
127. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 329-330 (1988); BANKR. R. 2017.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1988).
129. Id.; see In re Shah Int'l, Inc., 94 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding
that all fees remain subject to court approval despite prior agreement between debtors
and their attorneys).
130, See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l Inc., 324 F. Supp. 582 (D.N.J. 1971). Interim
compensation is any compensation received before the case is resolved.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
132. Id.; see BANKn. R. 2016; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Charles N.
Wooten, Ltd. (In re Evangeline Ref. Co.), 890 F.2d 1312, 1321 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the Bankruptcy Code specially provides for interim compensation).
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already rendered, (2) time spent, (3) expenses incurred, (4) the amount
requested, (5) payments made or promised for services performed or to
be performed, and (6) any fee sharing agreement. 133 All parties in in-
terest must receive notice of the application.1 34
2. Court Approval of Compensation
After notice and a hearing the court can award compensation.1 3 5
The court will review the attorney's application for payment in light of
the compensation standards enumerated in section 330. It can award
"reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered. 3 6
This evaluation is based on the nature, extent, and value of the ser-
vices rendered, the time spent, and a comparison with the cost of com-
parable nonbankruptcy services."' The court also may award "reim-
bursement for actual, necessary expenses." 3 8 These standards are a
significant departure from the standards applicable under the Act."38
Despite these requirements some courts have approved advance
fee payments in a manner that effectively allows attorneys to avoid the
enumerated Code provisions which were enacted to protect the bank-
ruptcy res and creditor interests.14 0 These judicial circumventions of
the letter and spirit of the Bankruptcy Code presumably seek to ele-
vate attorney fee claims to an even higher status than that intended by
Congress. Whether this is necessary to attract a competent bankruptcy
bar because it eases attorneys' cash flow problems and assures that
money will be available to pay their fees,' or whether it is simply
133. BANKR. R. 2016.
134. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a), 331 (1988).
135. Id.
136. Id. § 330(a)(1).
137. Id.; see also In re Orthopaedic Technology, Inc., 97 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1989) (requiring detailed showing of attorney's expenses in reviewing request for
compensation under § 330).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2) (1988).
139. See Boddy v. United States Bankruptcy Court (In re Boddy), 950 F.2d 334, 337
(6th Cir. 1991) ("[U]nder the pre-Code Bankruptcy Act . . . economy of the debtor's
estate was a paramount concern. This notion that economy of the estate should govern
the award of attorney's fees was expressly repudiated by the Code.").
140. See In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re McDonald
Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
141. The bankruptcy bar complains loudly about the difficulty of being properly
compensated for doing bankruptcy work. Barbara Rabinovitz, Economic Conditions
Lead to Innovation in Practice: Option Bypasses U.S. Bankruptcy, MASS. LAW. WKLY.,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 1 (" 'It's like dentistry. . .. You've got to drill every tooth to get paid.
It's the same in bankruptcy.' "). Bankruptcy attorneys complain about the lack of uni-
formity among bankruptcy judges on what services are compensable and what rate of
pay applies to compensable services. Indeed, there are vast differences among the judi-
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another special rule for lawyers1 4 1 is an open question. Any attempt to
answer this question, however, requires a firm grounding in the law of
attorney retainer agreements.
V. RETAINER AGREEMENTS
A retainer agreement is an agreement to actually or potentially
perform legal services for a client.143 There are two types of retainer
agreements: General retainers and special retainers.
A. General Retainer Agreements
A general retainer, sometimes called a classic retainer, is an agree-
ment between the attorney and client in which the client agrees to pay
a fixed sum in exchange for the attorney's promise to be available to
perform, at an agreed price, any legal services that arise during a speci-
cial districts on which expenses must be borne by the lawyer as part of overhead, and
which expenses the attorney can be reimbursed for. The American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute's recent survey of bankruptcy practitioners and judges confirms this lack of uni-
formity. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE NATIONAL
REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES (G. Ray Warner rep.,
1991). For example, judges were asked whether they grant requests for reimbursement
for certain expenses, and the results were tabulated as follows: Ordinary Mail: 2/3 allow
reimbursement, I/3 disallow reimbursement, id. at 228; Express Mail: 90% allow reim-
bursement, 10% disallow reimbursement, id. at 230-31; Messenger Services: 75% allow
reimbursement, id. at 231; Fax Transmission: 73% reimburse at cost, 11% reimburse at
market rate, 16% disallow reimbursement, id. at 232; Photocopy Expenses: allowance
ranges from 10 cents to 50 cents per copy, id. at 236-37; In Town Meals: 14% reimburse
at cost, 5% reimburse at market rates, 81% disallow reimbursement, id. at 239; Parale-
gals: typically reimbursement is allowed for time spent on professional tasks, but denied
for clerical tasks that are considered part of overhead (there are, however, many varia-
tions on what tasks the judges consider professional), id. at 249; General Secretarial
Work: although this would seem to be a part of overhead, 31% of the attorneys that were
surveyed reported being reimbursed for general secretarial work, id. at 246.
142. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
143. The term "retainer" is ambiguous because in actual practice it is used to refer
to three distinct circumstances: The retainer agreement between the attorney and client;
the consideration paid in advance to the attorney for work to be done under the agree-
ment, that is, an advance fee payment, see infra text accompanying note 148; and a
general retainer payment for availability, see infra text accompanying note 144. See also
In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 686 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988) ("The term
'retainer' has become inherently ambiguous ... ."). When lawyers state that they have
"accepted a retainer," they usually mean that the advance fee they have demanded and
received is nonrefundable. This usage rarely is correct. For purposes of precision this
Article will use the word "retainer" to refer to a special retainer advance fee payment,
that is, to the fee paid in advance for specific services and not to either a general retainer
payment or to the employment contract.
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fled period.'44 Because the consideration for a general retainer is paid
in exchange for availability, it is a charge separate from the fees in-
curred for services actually performed.
145
Because general retainer fees are intended only to compensate an
attorney for availability and not for actual legal services, they are re-
garded as earned in full upon receipt. Therefore, the fiduciary client
discharge rule, which provides that an attorney discharged by the cli-
ent before completion of the contract task cannot seek breach of con-
tract damages but is limited to a recovery in quantum meruit,"64 does
not apply to a general retainer. 4 7 Rather, the attorney is allowed the
contract price as damages when a client breaches a general retainer
agreement.
B. Special Retainer Agreements
A special retainer is an agreement in which an attorney promises
to perform specific legal services. If a payment is made before the at-
torney performs the services, it is denominated as an advance fee
payment.
1. Advance Fee Retainers
An advance fee is a contractually mandated payment made by a
client to an attorney prior to the performance of the contemplated ser-
vices. The attorney depletes the prepayment as the services are ren-
dered. If the matter is completed or the attorney's work on the matter
otherwise ends before the advance fee has been fully earned, the attor-
ney is obligated to refund the balance of the advance payment to the
client. 48 Advance fee payments must be deposited to the attorney's
client security account because they are "funds of clients" until
earned.149 Although some bar association opinions provide that ad-
144. Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be
Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 649 n.13 (1989).
145. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 158.
146. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916); Brickman & Cunningham, supra
note 5, at 155-56; see Brickman, supra note 66, at 367.
147. Martin, 114 N.E. at 48. The basis for this exception to the client discharge rule
has been severely questioned. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 157-60.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. (1983) ("A lawyer may
require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion.");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(3) (1980); see also D.C. Bar
Op. 113, at I (May 18, 1982); Wash. State Bar Ass'n Code of Professional Responsibility
Comm., Formal Op. 173, reprinted in WASH. STATE BAR NEws, Oct. 1980, at 50.
149. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(A) (1980); see also
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vance payments are not funds of the client but rather funds of the
attorney and therefore are to be deposited in the general office ac-
count, 10 the majority view is to the contrary.
2. Nonrefundable Retainers
A nonrefundable retainer is a form of special retainer agreement
between a lawyer and client that (1) provides for the payment of part
or all of the fee in advance of the lawyer's performance, and (2)
designates the advance payment as nonrefundable. 5' Under fiduciary
law and ethical codes, most nonrefundable retainers are illegal and
unethical.5 2
The majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the client dis-
charge rule have not given nonrefundable retainers an imprimatur of
validity.' In these jurisdictions fiduciary law imparts into the retainer
agreement a provision that allows the client to terminate the agree-
ment at will upon a loss of trust and confidence in the attorney."' The
unfettered right to discharge requires the corollary right that the client
cannot be compelled to pay contract damages upon termination. 55 En-
forcing nonrefundable retainers would defeat the client discharge rule
because, by designating advance fees as nonrefundable, the attorney
effectively would be imposing a penalty upon the discharging client in
contravention of the rule.
Even jurisdictions that reject the client discharge rule do not up-
hold nonrefundable retainers. Unless categorized by courts as sui
generis, in order to create a special rule for lawyers, nonrefundable re-
tainers, from a traditional contract perspective, are a form of liqui-
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983); Brickman, supra note 144, at
648-49.
150. Brickman, supra note 144, at 650, 654-55 & nn.47-48. These opinions have been
sharply criticized by the senior author as contrary to rules of ethics, fiduciary law, and
public policy. See id. at 654-75.
151. Disputes over the validity of these agreements usually arise when the client
terminates the lawyer's employment without legally sufficient cause before the lawyer
completes the designated task and demands return of the unearned part of the fee. Be-
cause the client discharge rule precludes the attorney from obtaining contract damages,
but instead relegates the attorney to quantum meruit, see supra note 146 and accompa-
nying text, the only way in which the attorney can keep the unearned portion of the
advance fee is to assert that the advance fee payment was designated nonrefundable and
for a court to uphold the validity of that designation.
152. See Jennings v. Backmeyer, 569 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). See generally
Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 150-57 (examining the legal and ethical valid-
ity of nonrefundable retainers).
153. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 150 n.4.
154. See Brickman, supra note 66, at 370-71, 376-79.
165. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916).
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dated damages clause. However, virtually all nonrefundable retainers
fail to meet the test for liquidated damages and therefore are unen-
forceable penalties. 15
A jurisdiction that rejects the fiduciary law-inspired client dis-
charge rule and also exempts lawyers' retainer agreements from the
reach of contract law's liquidated damages rule157 may nonetheless con-
template upholding the validity of a nonrefundable retainer on the ba-
sis of statutory law. Many jurisdictions have adopted a version of lNew
York's Field Code and its later codifications' which provide that at-
torney compensation is "governed by agreement, express or implied,
which is not restrained by law."'' 9 Read literally, and in this instance
wrongly, the statute appears to mean that if a lawyer contracts for a
nonrefundable retainer, the retainer can be enforced.6 0 Not so. The
statute, both in its original form and in its recodifications, sought only
to abolish the "fee bills," which regulated attorney fees by fixing allow-
able charges for attorney services."6' Neither the Field Code nor its
later codifications were intended to diminish the judiciary's role in su-
perintending attorney-client agreements,' 62 let alone create a special
rule for lawyers that would exempt them from general contract law.
Although no court has countenanced nonrefundable retainers and
the few that have considered the matter mostly have rejected their va-
lidity, 6 3 a few bar associations have opined that nonrefundable retain-
ers are valid. 6 4 Discarding professional responsibility and opting for a
more lucrative alternative, these bar association opinions represent the
pinnacle of professional irony for a profession that claims to operate in
156. For a detailed analysis of the contract law aspects of the nonrefundable re-
tainer, see Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 176-89. There are rare instances
when a nonrefundable retainer might be valid under contract law. See id. at 188-89.
157. The irony of this position, of course, is that such a jurisdiction not only rejects
the fiduciary content of the attorney-client relationship but in fact turns that doctrine on
its head. Instead of fiduciary law protecting the client, reverse fiduciary law deprives the
client of even common-law contract protection.
158. For a partial list, see Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 170 n.137.
159. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474 (McKinney 1983).
160. For a detailed analysis of the "unrestrained by law" statutes, their legislative
history, and their historically accurate meaning, see Brickman & Cunningham, supra
note 5, at 170-76.
161. Id. at 172-76.
162. See Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sand. 696, 698 (Super. Ct. City of N.Y. 1851) ("Before
the [Field] [C]ode, the court had the general power of examining into [attorney-client]
bargains ... to see that they were not unreasonable or oppressive, and the power has
not been taken away.").
163. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 150 n.4; see also Joel R. Bran-
des, P.C. v. Zigmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
164. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 150 n.5.
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the public interest.6 5 Consider that these bar associations are validat-
ing the use of nonrefundable retainers, which usually amount to sev-
eral thousand dollars each, in the teeth of contrary contract law and
fiduciary law that imposes a non-self-interested and non-arms-length
standard on the lawyer 68 and when nearly all jurisdictions have deter-
mined that in the arms-length commercial law sale-of-goods context
the forfeiture of the nonrefundable retainer equivalent, an advance
down payment, is limited to a reasonable amount or twenty percent of
the value of total performance up to a maximum of $500.117 Were it up
to these bar associations, a purchaser of a used car who paid a $2000
nonrefundable down payment towards a purchase price of $5000 and
then reneged on the purchase likely would be entitled to a return of
$1500 (assuming that the seller's incidental and consequential damages
totalled $500 or less), but a client who gave the same advance payment
to a lawyer for legal services would not be entitled to any refund re-
gardless of how little work the lawyer had done. It seems plausible to
contend that the lawyer-fiduciary should at least be held to the same
standard as the used car seller.
3. Security Retainers
Another purported form of special retainer, which apparently is
used only in the bankruptcy context, is the security retainer. This re-
tainer is "held by the attorneys to secure payment of fees for future
services."1 68 Although security retainers require a payment in advance
for services to be rendered, "the money given to the debtors' attorneys
is not present payment for the future services. Rather, the retainer re-
mains the property of the debtor until the attorney 'applies' it to
charges for services actually rendered; any unearned funds are turned
over by the attorneys." ''
165, "The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived
in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of
the bar." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
166. The lawyer-client relationship is not one at arms length, but rather is a fiduci-
ary relationship based upon trust and confidence; fee arrangements between lawyer and
client are not ordinary commercial contracts. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra
note 7, at 64-66.
167. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1)-(2) (1966). Under the UCC the seller is entitled to dam-
ages for the buyer's breach. If damages are $500 or less, the buyer is entitled to restitu-
tion of the amount that the down payment exceeds 20% of the value of total perform-
ance or $500, whichever is less. If damages are more than $500, then this limitation
would not decrease the buyer's entitlement to damages or to set off those damages
against the down payment. Id. § 2-718(3).
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The chimerical quality of the security retainer is immediately ap-
parent from the prior statement: "[T]he money given to the debtors'
attorneys is not present payment for the future services.' 170 Of course,
it is precisely that: it is present payment in advance for future
services.""
In the context in which the term is used in bankruptcy, there is no
such thing as a security retainer.17 2 For a security retainer to exist,
"[The agreement should provide that: (1) the retainer is deemed a trust fund,
subject to deposit in the firm's client trust account ... ; (2) any interest ac-
crual on the retainer amount are added to the retainer; (3) the firm has the
right to apply against the retainer amount all accrued time charges and reim-
bursable costs on a monthly basis upon the submission to the client of detailed
statements of such time charges and reimbursable costs ... and (4) if either
the client or the firm notifies the other party in writing of its decision to termi-
nate the agreement, the balance of the retainer amount may be applied to all
accrued but unpaid charges ... and any remainder will be returned .. ."
Id.'(quoting STANLEY B. BERNSTEIN, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY COMPENSATION GUIDE, 1 203, at
2-13 (1989)).
170. Id.
171. The term "security retainer" is a shibboleth used by those seeking to flee from
the requirements of §§ 330 and 331. However, the security retainer does not afford such
refuge. "[B]ecause the debtor continues to hold an interest in security retainers, such a
retainer is estate property, which can only be used by debtor's counsel upon compliance
with the entire fee application process, including court approval." Id. at 1000.
172. In theory, one could devise a security retainer that would apply in the bank-
ruptcy context. See STANLEY B. BERNSTEIN, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY COMPENSATION GUIDE
2.06[5], at 2-32 (1991). The process would begin with a prepetition payment to the attor-
ney as cash collateral securing the payment of both prepetition and postpetition services.
This retainer would be deposited to the lawyer's trust account. Prepetition services
would be billed in a timely fashion and paid by the client upon receipt. Postpetition
services would be billed and, upon court approval and after the requisite time interval,
would be paid by the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The cash collateral on deposit in
the trust account would secure these payments; hence the retainer would be a security
retainer. Upon completion of services and payment, the security retainer would be re-
turned to the client or to the estate. The lawyer could transfer some or all of the retainer
to his or her own account only in the event of nonpayment and only upon court approval
of the payment. However, in the bankruptcy context if the prepetition payment is in fact
an advance fee payment (as it almost always is) and not a security device, it cannot be
denominated as a security retainer. For a determination to the contrary that ignores all
of these arguments, see In re Viscount Furniture Corp., 133 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1991).
A variation of the security retainer that is in actual use is for the advance fee pay-
ment to be held in the client trust account and applied against the final invoice with the
client making monthly payments for the initial and middle phases of the representation.
See BERNSTEIN, supra, at 2-33. This practice, referred to as an "evergreen retainer pay-
ment," was disallowed on the policy grounds that it created an incentive for generating
unnecessary work. In re Fitzsimmons Trucking, Inc., 124 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1991); In re Cal-Inland, Inc., 124 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). It also has been
approved. In re Benjamin's-Arnolds, Inc., 123 B.R. 839 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
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there must be some security' for payment of the lawyer's fee. An ad-
vance fee payment, however, being the payment for the service, is not
therefore security for the payment obligation. 1 7  Nothing is being se-
cured 17 5 by collateral. 178 The so-called security retainer does not secure
the payment of compensation. 17 7 The payment of a security retainer is
not intended to create a fall back asset, or secondary obligation 178 to
which the attorney-creditor can look for satisfaction in the event of
default. On the contrary, the typical so-called security retainer is an
advance fee payment that secures nothing.17 9 Indeed, it is better than
173. Black's Law Dictionary defines security as:
Protection; assurance; indemnification. The term is usually applied to an obli-
gation, pledge, mortgage, deposit, lien, etc., given by a debtor in order to assure
the payment or performance of his debt, by furnishing the creditor with a re-
source to be used in case of failure in the principle obligation. Collateral given
by debtor to secure loan.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (6th ed. 1990).
174. It is the client-not the attorney-who has a security interest in the advance
fee because the client can demand the return of any unused portion of the advance pay-
ment upon termination of the attorney's services.
175. "One 'secures' his creditor by giving him a lien, mortgage, pledge, or other se-
curity, to be used in case the debtor fails to make payment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1354 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
176. Collateral is defined as: "Property which is pledged as security for the satisfac-
tion of a debt. Collateral is additional security for performance of principal obligation, or
that which is by the side, and not in direct line." Id. at 261; see also Shaffer v. Davidson,
445 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 1968) (citing several similar definitions of collateral).
177. The UCC definition of security interest is "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1966).
Because the advance payment is the actual payment, it does not "secure[] pay-
ment." Id. Moreover, unlike a performance bond, the advance payment does not secure
the lawyer's performance of his obligation to render legal services. As for an argument
that the performance being secured is that of the client, that obligation is, of course, to
pay. Hence the phrase "secures payment" deals with the client's payment obligation, not
the clause "secures. . . performance of an obligation." Id.
178. The McDonald court incorrectly found that a security retainer comes within
the definition of a pledge. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 999 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1990). A retainer fee, however, cannot be a pledge because a retainer fee does
not secure any debt. The definition of a pledge is:
A bailment, pawn, or deposit of personal property to a creditor as security for
some debt or engagement. Personal property transferred to pledgee as security
for pledgor's payment of debt or other obligation. A pledge, considered as a
transaction, is a bailment or delivery of goods or property by way of security
for a debt or engagement, or as security for the performance of an act.. . . A
lien created by delivery of personal property by owner to another, upon ex-
press or implied agreement that it shall be retained as security for existing or
future debt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
179. Because the client's money is placed in a trust account over which only the
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security for payment; it is payment.' 0
VI. RETAINER AGREEMENTS CONSUMMATED IN ANTICIPATION OF
BANKRUPTCY
A. The Use of General Retainers in Bankruptcy
The Bankruptcy Code's fee application procedure applies only to
property of the estate,18' which is defined as "all legal or equitable in-
terests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case."' 82 Because a general retainer becomes property of the attorney
upon receipt,183 it has been held that a general retainer paid prior to
commencement of the case is not part of the debtor's estate.
8 4
Although an attorney must disclose the receipt of a general re-
tainer payment pursuant to section 329,185 the attorney is not subject
to the more demanding requirements of section 330, especially the bur-
den of proving, after notice and a hearing, that the fees were for actual
and necessary services' 86 that benefitted the estate. 8 7 By getting a gen-
bankruptcy court, upon performance by the attorney in accordance with the terms of the
retainer agreement, can release the monies, the relationship is more akin to an escrow
agreement than a security agreement. Black's Law Dictionary defines escrow as:
A legal document (such as a deed), money, stock, or other property delivered
by the grantor, promisor or obligor into the hands of a third person, to be held
by the latter until the happening of a contingency or performance of a condi-
tion, and then by him delivered to the grantee, promisee or obligee. A system
of document transfer in which a deed, bond, stock, funds, or other property is
delivered to a third person to hold until all conditions in a contract are fulfilled
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (6th ed. 1990).
180. Because both the so-called security retainer and the actual security retainer are
payment in advance for services to be rendered, however, they are not "value" as used in
§ 548, 11 U.S.C.'§ 548 (1988), and it is possible that an advance payment can be attacked
as a fraudulent transfer. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
181. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 993-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
183. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
184. McDonald, 114 B.R. at 998-99.
185. The court can order the attorney to repay a general retainer if it exceeds a
reasonable value. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988).
186. Id. § 330. Under § 330 an attorney can receive payment only after the services
have been performed and the court is satisfied that the attorney has carried the burden
of persuasion.
187. In re James Contracting Group, 120 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
"Examples of services which cannot be said to have benefitted the estate are where the
work was performed for non-bankruptcy matters, where the services were rendered to
benefit the debtor personally or where the services were actually in opposition to the
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eral retainer from the debtor prior to filing the debtor's petition, attor-
neys can obviate their section 330 duty to go before the court and jus-
tify their fees. Thereupon, any party in interest who objects to the
propriety of the fee would have to initiate the objection and carry the
burden of persuasion. 88
The use of general retainers in bankruptcy is problematic. Outside
of the bankruptcy context, clients use general retainer agreements for a
variety of reasons: to ensure the availability of a particular attorney, to
secure an attorney who has unique skills or knowledge, to hedge
against an expected contingency that might require a large team of le-
gal specialists that would be difficult to assemble on short notice, or to
deprive competitors or hostile suitors of a feared attorney's services. 18 9
These motives lose much of their force when the debtor is insolvent.
From the point of view of the attorney contemplating postpetition
work for the soon-to-file debtor, the earned-upon-receipt aspect of the
general retainer is most attractive. Not surprisingly, therefore, general
retainers are used in the bankruptcy context. While the use of a gen-
eral retainer agreement to assure postpetition availability can be legiti-
mate, it is more likely that the attorney has denominated a special re-
tainer advance fee as a general retainer in order to evade the
bankruptcy court's scrutiny.'90 It is very rare that an advance fee is
paid prepetition solely for availability and not as payment for legal ser-
vices to be rendered postpetition; indeed, most attempts to disguise
advance fees as general retainers fail. In discussing this pretextual sub-
terfuge, one court has stated:
[T]his Court questions whether any retainer deemed by the parties to
be earned in advance of legal services, even the historically "classic
retainer" paid in exchange solely for an attorney's promise of future
availability and the necessary incidents to maintaining such availabil-
ity, is ever a viable means of compensating counsel for a debtor-in-
possession. Attorney compensation in a bankruptcy case is premised
on performance of legal services which benefit, the estate, not on mere
availability for such purpose or promises to perform such services if
estate's administration." Id.; see also In re Leff, 88 B.R. 105, 108-09 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988), aff'd sub noma. Stewart v. Law Offices of Dennis Olson, 93 B.R. 91 (N.D. Tex.
1988), afl'd, 878 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1989). These holdings under the Code are consistent
with holdings under the Act. See, e.g., In re Walchef Dev. Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.
Cal. 1975).
188. BANKR. R. 2017; In re Saturley, 131 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
189. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 158 n.50.
190. Cf. Jacobson v. Sassower, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985 (Civ. Ct. 1982) ("[T]his re-
tainer agreement is commonly used throughout the New York City Metropolitan area."),
aff'd, 47,4 N.Y.S,2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1983), afl'd, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div.), aff'd, 489
N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985); AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, supra note 141, at 91 (stat-
ing that in bankruptcy the "use of pre-petition attorney retainers is not uncommon").
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necessary in the future. 91
Moreover, from a policy perspective, the use of a general retainer
in the bankruptcy context is inappropriate. It can lead attorneys to
inflate the value of their availability. Any exaggeration of value, except
the most egregious, would be difficult for a party in interest to uncover
and inefficient to prosecute. Even if an exaggerated general retainer
were challenged, putting a value on an attorney's availability could be
difficult in a bankruptcy setting, although one bankruptcy court has
forthrightly assessed that the value of such availability is negligible.
19 2
Finally, the generally accepted view that general retainers are
earned upon receipt and are therefore nonrefundable may not with-
stand bankruptcy law analysis. Under section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code,' " the trustee can avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in which the debtor receives "less than a reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for such transfer or obligation.' 194 Value, for the purposes
of section 548 "does not include an unperformed promise to furnish
support to the debtor."'' 95 In the bankruptcy context general retainers
entail an agreement by the attorney to be available to file a bankruptcy
petition on behalf of the debtor client and to be available to perform
postpetition legal work for the bankruptcy estate. Because availability,
by definition, can be effectuated only in the future, the propriety of all
prepetition general retainers under section 548 is questionable. More-
over, because there is no exchange of reasonably equivalent value, the
trustee--who, if he is a debtor in possession, paid the fee to the law-
yer-has a fraudulent transfer claim against the attorney. This creates
a conflict of interest that is disqualifying for the lawyer. 9 6
191. In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212, 223 n.11 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
192. A true earned upon receipt retainer is one paid to a lawyer for which the
only consideration exchanged is the promise to represent the client and no
other party in the particular matter. The consideration cannot include logically
the provision of future services if the retainer is truly earned upon receipt. I
find there is little or no value in a professional's mere promise to represent a
debtor in possession and no other party in a bankruptcy case. The value of
such a promise is negligible, absent extraordinary circumstances. The true
value provided by the professional is the provision of actual, necessary and
effective services.
In re Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116 B.R. 208, 216 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (citation
omitted).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
194. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
195. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A).
196. Further, this absence of an exchange of reasonably equivalent value gives
rise to a claim for fraudulent transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 544.
This would be a claim owned and asserted by a bankruptcy estate against its
own lawyer. The existence of such a claim means counsel for a debtor in pos-
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B. The Use of Special Retainer-Advance Fee Payments in
Bankruptcy
There is an increasing tendency among bankruptcy attorneys to
seek a substantial portion of their fees for postpetition work prepeti-
tion, that is, in advance of the performance of their services.117 Two
issues are raised when attorneys obtain these payments. First, are the
payments permissible? Second, if they are permissible, are they subject
to the supervision of the bankruptcy court?
1. Are Advance Fees Unperformed Promises of No Value?
Section 548 of the Code,19s which is entitled fraudulent transfers
session is not a "disinterested person" and that said counsel would hold an
interest adverse to that of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and
101(13)(E). Thus any lawyer who accepted a true earned upon receipt retainer
would be disqualified from representing a debtor in possession.
Hathaway Ranch, 116 B.R. at 216. But see In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 397
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (quoting In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1987)). When-
ever an attorney does work for the debtor in possession, the attorney becomes a creditor
of the estate. That creates a conflict of interest that is permitted under the Code because
disqualifying the attorney would "'virtually eliminate any possibility of legal assistance
for a debtor in possession.'" Id. Therefore, becoming a creditor of the estate prior to
doing any work for the estate, i.e., prepetition, is also permissible. Martin, 817 F.2d at
180 n.5.
197. See generally Kraus, supra note 15. "[Tjhe vast majority of lawyers represent-
ing Chapter 11 debtors have received pre-petition retainers at least once . . . . [Ujse of
pre-petition attorney retainers is not uncommon." AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE,
supra note 141, at 91. For examples of cases in which attorneys charged prepetition re-
tainers, see cases cited infra note 205.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred
on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obliga-
tion was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage
in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
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and obligations, allows the trustee to avoid any fraudulent transfer of
an interest in the debtor's property if the transfer meets the conditions
of section 548(a). Of the different avoiding powers available to the
trustee, the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Code are of the most
utility to a vigilant trustee in scrutinizing prepetition advance fee
retainers.
Under section 548(a) the trustee can avoid two types of transfers.
The first is a transfer of any interest in the debtor's property that was
made with the actual intent to defraud, hinder, or delay a past or fu-
ture creditor. 199 The second is any transfer of an interest in the
debtor's property that was not made in exchange for reasonably
equivalent value that (1) occurred at a time when the debtor was insol-
vent, or (2) caused the debtor to become insolvent, or (3) left the
debtor with too little capital, or (4) was made by a debtor who in-
tended to incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to repay. 0
Congress defined the term "value" for purposes of section 548 so
as to exclude "an unperformed promise to furnish support to the
debtor.'' 20 1 This definition, if given effect by the bankruptcy courts
rather than being ignored, would have a significant chilling effect on
advance fee payments. A debtor's advance fee payment to a lawyer in
return for a promise to perform legal services in the future would ap-
pear to be avoidable by the trustee as a fraudulent transfer because the
debtor has not received "reasonably equivalent value" as defined in the
Code.
20 2
Bankruptcy courts have avoided any sua sponte challenges to ad-
vance fee payments to attorneys as unperformed promises, and there-
fore, fraudulent transfers. In the limited number of reported cases in
which the bankruptcy courts have examined whether attorney fees are
fraudulent transfers, they have not addressed the question of whether
an attorney fee paid prior to performance of services is a transfer made
for "an unperformed promise," and whether the attorney's promise is
"less than a reasonably equivalent value." Thus, the validity of ad-
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured.
Id. § 548(a) (1988).
199. Id. § 548(a)(1).
200. Id. § 548(a)(2).
201. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A). The definition of value is: "property, or satisfaction or se-
curing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unper-
formed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." Id.
(emphasis added).
202. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A). However, the attorney's interest in fees earned may be pro-
tected by § 548(c). Section 548(c) gives the transferee of a fraudulent conveyance who is
not liable to the trustee under any other section and who gave value in good faith a lien
on the transferred property to the extent of the value given. Id. § 548(c).
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vance fee payments in the bankruptcy context remains unresolved.20 3
2. Are Advance Fee Payments Subject to Court Supervision?
Not surprisingly, attorneys who demand advance fee payments
seek to treat these payments "as their own money-i.e., to spend
it-without first obtaining court approval of a fee application."2 '0
Overwhelmingly, bankruptcy courts, pursuant to sections 330 and 331,
have rejected this importuning.
20 5
The rationale for requiring court approval of a professional's com-
pensation from the estate was set forth in In re Ross2 0 8 :
The funds of a bankruptcy estate are trust funds. The Court has a
duty to see that these funds are administered in a manner consistent
with the intent of the Bankruptcy Code. This duty exists independent
of any objections that may be filed by parties in interest. Thus, an
attorney for the trustee may only receive payment pursuant to a court
order authorizing the trustee to disburse such funds.1
0 7
Despite the overwhelming rejection of attorneys' attempts to cir-
cumvent the fee superintendence required by the Bankruptcy Code,
several recent opinions have countenanced such circumvention: In re
McDonald Brothers Construction, Inc., 58 followed quickly by In re
D.L.LC., Inc. 210 These courts have sought to create another special rule
for lawyers; in the process they have misinterpreted the Code, misap-
plied state law, and rejected the clearly stated intent of Congress.
203, There is no reported case in which a court has ruled on whether an advance fee
paid to an attorney is "an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor" and
therefore not "value" as defined in § 548(d)(2)(A).
204. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 993 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1990).
205. In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212, 225 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); In re Doors & More,
Inc., 127 B.R. 1001, 1004 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991); In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R.
394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989); In re Martin, 102 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1989); In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988); In re
Wyslak, 94 B.R. 540, 542 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988); In re Shah Int'l, Inc., 94 B.R. 136, 139
(Bankr. E.D. Wis, 1988); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 817-18 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Tri-County Water Ass'n, 91 B.R: 547, 550-51 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1988); In re Burnside Steel Foundary Co., 90 B.R. 942, 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re
Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R, 719, 734 n.21, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re
Leff, 88 B.R. 105, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988), aft'd sub nom. Stewart v. Law Offices of
Dennis Olson, 93 B.R. 91 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 878 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1989); In re
Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 573-75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re
Kinderhaus Corp., 58 B.R. 94, 97 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
206. 88 B.R. 471 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.), remanded on other grounds, 94 B.R. 210 (M.D.
Ga, 1988).
207. Id. at 475.
208. 114 B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1990).
209. 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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a. In re McDonald Brothers
In McDonald the court addressed the applicability of the Code to
a debtor's prepetition advance fee payment for postpetition work.210
The court concluded that the advance fee paid to debtor's attorney was
no longer property of the client upon payment and therefore, never
became property of the bankruptcy estate. Because the advance fee
was not estate property, the court found that it was not subject to the
fee oversight provisions in sections 330 and 331,211 but was subject only
to the disclosure requirements in section 329.212
The court's analysis of the various kinds of advance fee payments
is confusing to the point of obfuscation and tends to distract the eye
from following the swiftly moving fee pea. A close examination of the
McDonald court's movement of the fee pea from shell to shell reveals
that the court inaccurately analyzed retainer agreements, ethical rules,
state law, and the Bankruptcy Code.
210. The debtor paid its attorneys $12,500 in contemplation of filing a bankruptcy
petition. After the petition was filed, the attorneys sought an order from the court grant-
ing them "leave to apply" the "retainer." McDonald, 114 B.R. at 992. The court rea-
soned that because the transfer of property took place prior to the petition date, the
entire $12,500 retainer was property of the attorneys. The attorneys, therefore, were not
required to apply to the court for compensation. Id. at 1002-03.
211. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330-331 (1988). Fee application procedures, the court stated, apply
only when an attorney seeks compensation from the estate.
[Tihe fee application procedure only applies when a professional is seeking an
award payable from the estate. Nothing in the [Bankruptcy Code] authorizes a
court to award compensation or reimbursement of expenses from a source
other than the estate. . . . Thus, professionals who hold funds that do not be-
long to the estate need not, and should not, seek an award of those funds
through the fee application process.
McDonald, 114 B.R. at 994.
212. Although the court held that the payment was subject to the monitoring func-
tion of § 329, which requires disclosure and allows avoidance if the compensation exceeds
the reasonable value of the services, the court eschewed even that function pending a
challenge by an interested party. McDonald, 114 B.R. at 995, 1003.
According to the Code the right to invoke §§ 547(b), 548(a), and 544(a) and (b) rests
with the trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)-(b), 547(b)-(d), 548(b)-(c) (1988). However, case law
has extended that right to creditors in some circumstances. In In re Xonics Photochemi-
cal, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988), the court stated that a creditor, who first demon-
strates that the debtor in possession has abrogated its duty, can bring "a form of deriva-
tive suit" in the name of the debtor and invoke § 548(a) or § 544(b) to avoid a transfer.
Id. at 203; see William B. Tanner Co. v. United States (In re Automated Business Sys.,
Inc.), 642 F.2d 200, 201 (6th Cir. 1981). However, the duty to invoke the avoiding powers
belongs to the trustee or debtor in possession in the first instance. Xonics Photochemi-
cal, 841 F.2d at 203.
10791992]
43
Brickman and Klein: The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(i) McDonald on Retainer Agreements
The McDonald court posited three kinds of advance fee retainer
payments: the general retainer, the "security retainer,"2 ' and the "ad-
vance payment retainer. 2 14 The latter two, which are special retainers,
are mutant progeny of the special retainer advance fee pay-
ment-merely titles into which an amalgam of disparate principles
have been poured. The resulting security retainer and advance pay-
ment retainer are mere chimeras masquerading as legitimate forms of
retainer payments that evanesce under close scrutiny.
As noted above there is no such thing as a security retainer as that
term is typically used in the bankruptcy context.2 15 As for the court's
advance payment retainer, it is a conceptual transposition of the ad-
vance fee payment into a hybrid consisting of: (1) an advance fee pay-
ment that must be deposited into the lawyer's own account, rather
than the client trust account, and (2) a nonrefundable retainer.216 Mc-
Donald does not call an advance fee payment an advance fee payment
as we have used that term because, according to the court, advance fee
payments are nonrefundable. 17 Indeed, in an attempt to insulate ad-
vance fee payments from the Bankruptcy Code's fee application pro-
cess, the McDonald court refused to acknowledge the existence of any
refundable advance fee payment-even one deposited to the lawyer's
account.
213, McDonald, 114 B.R. at 999-1000.
214. Id. at 1000-01.
215. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
216. See McDonald, 114 B.R. at 1000 ("[Tlhe debtor pays, in advance, for some or
all of the services that the attorney is expected to perform . . . . This type of retainer
differs from the security retainer in that ownership of the retainer is intended to pass to
the attorney at the time of payment . . ").
217. The court does not explicitly state that advance payment retainers are
nonrefundable; nonetheless, it is clear that that is exactly how the court treated them.
Both in terms of its usage and its reliance on authority, the McDonald court denoted the
advance payment retainer as nonrefundable. Thus, in support of its analysis of the ad-
vance payment retainer, the court cited: (1) Illinois State Bar Ass'n Op. 722, at 16 (1981)
as "approving nonrefundable advance payment retainers," McDonald, 114 B.R. at 1001
(emphasis added); (2) a 1987 Illinois case and implied therefrom~that retainer contracts
that contain "an explicit non-refundability provision" are not inappropriate, id. (empha-
sis added); (3) a 1986 bankruptcy court decision, which "set[] forth a retainer agreement
in which it is stated that the retainer is 'fully earned and nonrefundable upon its pay-
ment and receipt,'" id. at 1000 (emphasis added), and indicated that the case's operative
facts are similar to those sub judice (i.e., both cases involved an advance payment re-
tainer intended to cover only a part of the work to be performed); and (4) two Illinois
cases about which the McDonald court observed: "If it were improper to accept any
advance payment [nonrefundable] retainer, the courts would have no reason to consider
whether retainers like the ones in [those cases] were excessive." Id. at 1001-02.
(Vol. 431080
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Moreover, although the court accurately describes the general re-
tainer,21 it apparently misapplied the term to the facts of the case.
219
Thus, it quoted from the applicants' brief that the advance fee paid
was a general retainer "'paid for purposes of obtaining their services
[and therefore] was earned upon . .. receipt.' ",220 The court then
stated that the applicants "confirmed their position that the retainer
was an advance payment for services to be rendered in the case"'221 and
"was, as they represent, an advance fee retainer."'' 2 2 These two posi-
tions are, of course, inconsistent. A general retainer is payment for
availability, not "an advance payment for services to be rendered.
'223
Because the court held that advance fee retainers are nonrefundable
and because a general retainer is earned upon receipt and therefore is
218. McDonald, 114 B.R. at 997-99.
219. The attorneys' own characterization of the retainer agreement is contradictory.
They gave it attributes of both a general and a special retainer. Id. at 992. In fact, it was
a special retainer and the court, in the end, so held. Id. at 1002-03.
When the debtor in possession first filed a Rule 2014(a) application to have the
attorneys' employment approved by the court, it stated that "the attorneys would be
employed 'under a general retainer.'" Id. at 992. Thereupon, the court approved the
attorneys' employment. In their brief the attorneys stated that prior to entering into an
employment contract, they negotiated an agreement with the debtor and told the debtor
that "'the $12,500.00 was a fee paid for purposes of obtaining their services and getting
them involved in the case." Id.
However, the attorneys' brief went on to describe their understanding of the general
retainer, and the description includes provisions that clearly are not within the scope of
a general retainer. The attorneys proposed to:
(1) "apply the said retainer for the time they have spent ... and for further
work that will be necessary in the future"; (2) "account to the Court for all
time spent in and about the matter"; and (3) in the event the Court allows
total fees in an amount less than the retainer, "turn over to the Debtor all such
excess."
Id. During negotiations, the attorneys told the debtor that
"if he wanted them to take his Chapter 11 case and devote their time, energies,
and experience to the case, [the debtor] must pay them a retainer of $12,500.00
before they file the case," that "they undoubtedly would apply to the Court in
the future for additional compensation," and that "the $12,500.00 was a fee
paid for purposes of obtaining their services and getting them involved in the
case."
Id.
The attorneys also asserted that the debtor knew that "'(when the retainer was
paid, it ceased to be the property of [the debtor] and therefore it is not property of
Debtor's estate." Id. However, the court's opinion states that at an informal hearing the
attorneys confirmed that "the retainer was an advance payment for services to be ren-
dered in the case." Id. at 993. Therefore, the court appears to have treated the
$12,500.00 payment as an advance fee for work to be done later.
220. Id. at 992.
221. Id. at 993.
222. Id. at 1002.
223. Id. at 993.
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nonrefundable, it appears that lurking in the court's characterization
of the advance fee retainer are elements of the general retainer.
(ii) McDonald's Arguments on Whether an Advance Fee Payment
Is Subject to the Fee Application Process
The essential feature of the McDonald opinion is its determina-
tion that the advance fee payment, which the court terms an "advance
payment retainer," is not property of the estate. If so, then the estate
has no legal or equitable interest in the funds advanced, and the re-
tainer payment therefore is not subject to the Code's fee application
process. 224 Each of the elements of the court's argument in this regard
is analyzed below.
(1) Since "Funds of Clients" Equals Property of the Estate Then,
by Corollary, Not "Funds of Clients" Equals Not Property of the
Estate
As previously noted, both the Model Code and Model Rules man-
date that advance fee payments be deposited to the attorney's client
security account and withdrawn as earned.22 Under the ethical rules
advance fee payments are funds of the client.228 The McDonald court
held, however, that in Illinois advance payments are not funds of the
client but rather funds of the attorney227 and therefore for bankruptcy
purposes advance payments are not funds of the estate because only
advance fees that are funds of a client can be funds of the estate.
228
The court's syllogistic reasoning may be restated as follows: Since de-
nominating an advance fee payment as "funds of clients" as that term
is used in the ethical rules equates with "property of the estate" for
bankruptcy law purposes, then finding that an advance payment is not
"funds of clients" under the governing ethical regime leads to the con-
clusion that the payment is not property of the estate. The syllogism is
incorrect.
224. Id. at 1002.
225. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
226. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 & cmts. (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(A) (1980).
227. McDonald, 114 B.R. at 1001-02, 1002 n.17.
228. The court held that the client retains an interest in "security retainers," and
therefore security retainer payments became property of the estate. Id. at 999-1000. Ac-
cording to the court, the client does not, however, retain any interest in an advance
payment retainer, and advance retainer payments therefore do not become property of
the estate. Id. at 1002.
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Even if McDonald's analysis of state law is correct,229 it does not
follow that the Bankruptcy Code's fee application process is therefore
avoided. The term "funds of clients" in the ethical rules appears under
the heading "Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client"
230
and is a codification of an attorney's fiduciary obligation ' 31 to protect
clients' funds both from the attorney's creditors and from the attor-
ney's own temptation.232 Under the ethical rules a lawyer who deposits
an advance payment to the lawyer's personal account rather than to
the client trust account is guilty of commingling.
233
These ethical rules were not intended to constitute substantive
law, let alone define what funds become part of the bankruptcy es-
tate.23 4 Whether a prepayment of fees for work to be done later is
bankruptcy estate property is a matter of federal law to which the ethi-
cal rules do not speak. The conclusion, therefore, that a lawyer's fee
delineated "not funds of clients" under ethical rules translates into
"not property of the bankruptcy estate" under bankruptcy law is a non
sequitur.
(2) Unearned Funds Must Be Returned to the Client
The McDonald court's attempt to import elements of the general
retainer into the special retainer and to characterize advance fee pay-
ments as nonrefundable may reflect an intent to avoid the consequence
of the ethical requirement that upon termination a lawyer must
promptly refund any unearned portion of the advance fee payment.23 5
Because a client has the right, derivative of fiduciary law, to terminate
an employment contract with a lawyer without incurring contract dam-
ages, 236 the client retains an interest in an advance fee payment until it
229. For the analysis of why it is not correct, see infra notes 241-48 and accompany-
ing text.
230. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1980); see MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983).
231. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 7, at 44 n.65.
232. See Brickman, supra note 143, at 652-54.
233. See id. at 647-48.
234. Thus, the Preliminary Statement to the Model Code states that it does not
"undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980). The Scope to the Model Rules
states that "[v]iolation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action. . .. The Rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liabil-
ity." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 6 (1990).
235. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(3) (1980).
236. This is true of most jurisdictions, including Illinois. See Rhoades v. Norfolk &
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has been fully earned by performance. 2"7 That interest suffices to make
the advance fee payment estate funds for purposes of bankruptcy
law. 3" If the advance payments are denominated nonrefundable, how-
ever, the client does not retain any interest in them.2 39 Hence, the es-
sentiality of incorporating the concept of the nonrefundable retainer
into the retainer fee construct becomes apparent if one is to insulate
the advance fee payment from judicial scrutiny. As previously noted,
however, nonrefundable retainers violate both contract and ethical
laws.
2 40
(3) Advance Payment Retainers Are Permitted Under Illinois Law
McDonald asserted that "[u]nder Illinois law . . . advance pay-
ment retainers are permitted, for several reasons. ' 24' Bearing in mind
that McDonald denominated advance payment retainers as nonrefund-
able advance fee payments that are deposited to the lawyer's account,
we can now examine each of the pillars on which the McDonald court's
W. Ry., 399 N.E.2d 969, 974-75 (Ill. 1979); see also Brickman, supra note 66, at 367-68,
373 & n.37.
237. The client's interest includes the right to compel the attorney not to transfer
the funds to the attorney's account if the client disputes the fee. MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(c) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 9-102(A)(2) (1980).
238. See In re Leff, 88 B.R. 105, 107-08 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that the
entire retainer was property of the estate and rejecting the argument that the client's
interest was a mere contingent reversionary interest); cf. United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (holding that property that a judicial lien creditor seizes is
property of the estate even though the debtor had no possessory interest in the property
at the time that the petition was filed).
239. McDonald states that in order for an advance fee retainer not to be property of
the estate, the debtor must have no interest in the prepaid fee at the time the petition is
filed. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). Of
course, the client's ability to recapture at least part of the advance fee by terminating
the lawyer's employment is just such an interest. Moreover, even if the advance payment
is denominated as nonrefundable, the bankruptcy court can still order iome or all of it
returned to the estate under § 329 if the compensation exceeds "the reasonable value of
such services." 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988). According to McDonald, however, "the possibility
of this return does not give the debtor an interest in the transferred funds" but only a
potential claim, and "[i]t is the recovery of the funds involved in an 'avoided' transfer,
not the potential for recovery, that causes the funds to be considered part of the estate."
114 B.R. at 997.
240. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text; see also Brickman & Cunning-
ham, supra note 5, 150-53 (stating that nonrefundable retainers are unethical and ille-
gal); BERNSTEIN, supra note 172, 2.06[3], at 2-29 ("[A] provision in a written retainer
agreement that defines the retainer amount as earned upon receipt by the debtor's coun-
sel and nonrefundable upon a termination of the agreement is unenforceable.").
241. McDonald, 114 B.R. at 1001.
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(a) In Illinois an Attorney May Contract for Any Retainer
Agreement Without Restraint
"Illinois recognizes the general rule of freedom of contract with
respect to attorney's fees. ' 24 2 Therefore, the McDonald court inferred
that an attorney in Illinois can contract for an advance fee that is to be
deposited into the lawyer's personal account and that is denominated
nonrefundable.2 -3 In support of its analysis, the court cited Estate of
Harnetiaux v. Hartzell (In re Estate of Harnetiaux).2 4 That case,
which involved the propriety of a contingent fee in a wrongful death
case, not only does not support the proposition for which the McDon-
ald court cited it, but in fact stands in opposition to that proposition.
Nowhere did the Harnetiaux court state or suggest that Illinois law
recognizes a special rule for lawyers that validates nonrefundable re-
tainers; nor did the court state or suggest that advance fee payments
are not funds of the client that can be deposited to the lawyer's ac-
count. Furthermore, Harnetiaux neither stated nor suggested that the
bargain between a lawyer and client ousts the court's authority to su-
perintend attorney fees.245 Indeed, Illinois law is to the contrary.2 16 As
242. Id. (citing Estate of Harnetiaux v. Hartzell (In re Estate of Harnetiaux), 234
N.E.2d 81, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)).
243. The McDonald court's position that attorney fees are regulated according to
general contract law and not fiduciary law is even less credible when applied to an attor-
ney-client bargain for bankruptcy services. The about-to-be bankrupt client's need for
fiduciary protection is paramount. The attorney can afford the time necessary to create a
truly bargained-for agreement because the attorney's position is as strong on the first
day of negotiations as it is on any hypothetical future date. By contrast, an insolvent
debtor on the precipice of having his assets attached and petitioning the bankruptcy
court for protection lacks the time to negotiate in earnest with the attorney. The debtor
may not have the time necessary to screen the market for competitors that a plaintiff
would have in a traditional contract or tort case in which the statute of limitations is
measured in years. In this respect an insolvent party has the same problem in retaining
counsel at a competitive rate that a trustee has in receiving market value at a bank-
ruptcy liquidation sale. Attorneys, in the aggregate, are aware of the client's inability to
search for other fee bids just as the bidders at a liquidation auction are aware that the
trustee cannot delay the auction to seek additional bids. Although it is beyond the scope
of this Article to explain the phenomenon, it is a maxim of the bankruptcy bar, and lay
persons alike, that the trustee rarely realizes full value in a liquidation sale. In negotia-
tions both parties have a time premium when they are in roughly equal bargaining posi-
tions. If one party's position will diminish considerably in a short time, however, and
both the second party and other market participants know this, the party with the time
premium will exact a better bargain than the first party would have yielded had the first
party not been in an attenuated position.
244. 234 N.E.2d 81 (IM. App. Ct. 1968).
245. The "freedom of contract with respect to attorney's fees," McDonald, 114 B.R.
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noted in another opinion cited by the McDonald court, the freedom of
contract provision does not oust the Illinois courts' authority to super-
intend attorney fees.247 Moreover, the Harnetiaux court characterized
the contingent fee contract in that case as "reasonable, '248 thus indi-
cating that it was superintending the fee and belying any argument
that the general rule of freedom of contract displaces an Illinois court's
inherent authority to regulate attorney fee agreements.
(b) The Illinois State Bar Association Has Approved Advance
Payment Retainers
In addition to its misplaced reliance on Illinois case law, the Mc-
Donald court also relied on two opinions of the Illinois State Bar Asso-
ciation.24 ' However, the opinions of the Illinois State Bar Association
are not the law of Illinois; they are merely the self-interested state-
ments of a trade association that represents lawyers, and they do not
carry the imprimatur of either the state's legislature or its courts.
Illinois State Bar Association Opinion 703250 provides that advance
fee payments are not funds of the client under Disciplinary Rule 9-102
at 1001, in Illinois is nothing more than a version of the recodified Field Code that re-
pealed fee bills and allowed lawyers and clients to bargain over fees. As previously noted,
the language used in repealing the fee bills was not intended to oust the courts' long-
standing supervisory powers over lawyers' fees and lawyers' fiduciary responsibilities.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the development of law-
yers' fiduciary obligation to clients, see Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 7, at 45
n.66,
246. In re Teichner, 470 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. 1984) (holding that fees that are advanced
to cover future work remain property of the client and must be kept separate from attor-
ney funds and that the reasonableness of contingent fee contracts are always subject to
the scrutiny of the courts) (citing ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
106 (1970); Pocius v. Halvorsen, 195 N.E.2d 137 (II. 1964)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053
(1985).
247. In In re Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1979), the Illinois Supreme Court
explained:
Respondent's argument, as we interpret it, is that attorney-client fixed-fee
agreements, when freely entered into, are not subject to scrutiny by a discipli-
nary committee and may not form the basis for disciplinary action against an
attorney. Rather, respondent contends that any dispute over a fixed fee must
be resolved based on traditional contract principles in a court of law. In sup-
port of this argument, respondent cites Sokol v. Mortimer (1967), 81 Ill.App.2d
55, 225 N.E.2d 496. The Sokol case, however, is inapposite. It merely stands for
the proposition that attorney-client fee arrangements are not presumptively
fraudulent.
Id. at 964.
248, Harnetiaux, 234 N.E.2d at 84.
249. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1990).
250. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 703 (Nov. 24, 1980).
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unless they are expressly so designated in writing.25 ' However, the
Opinion also provides that "[i]f. . .a dispute should arise as to the fee
payable, the funds should be kept segregated in the lawyer's special
trust account." 252 This no doubt represents an attempt to accommo-
date to the protection afforded to the client in Disciplinary Rule 9-
102(A)(2) of the Model Code, which allows the lawyer to withdraw
funds that constitute the lawyer's fee from the trust account unless the
fee "is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall
not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
'25 3
The inanity of Opinion 703 therefore is exposed. If a client pays a
fee in advance, the Illinois attorney is to deposit it to the attorney's
own account. But if a dispute arises over the fee, the attorney is re-
quired to keep the funds in the client trust account. If the funds are
already in the lawyer's account, however, is the attorney to take the
funds out and deposit them to the client trust account? If so, then the
advance fees remain the functional equivalent of funds of the client
despite their contrary characterization. If the attorney is not required
to transfer the funds from the personal account to the trust account if
the fee is disputed, then the "if . . .a dispute should arise" language
of Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A)(2) is rendered nugatory.
Like Opinion 703, Illinois State Bar Association Opinion 72225 is
something less than a model of clarity and is self-contradictory. It
stated that an advance payment can be denominated nonrefundable
but only "as long as the fee is not excessive. '"255 Under Illinois law a
client who discharges an attorney can recover any part of an advance
payment that the attorney has not earned by performance at the time
of discharge. 25 Therefore, if the attorney seeks to keep the advance fee
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id.
253. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(A)(2) (1980). The Illi-
nois rule in effect at the time provided: "The portion of funds deposited in accounts
described in Rule 9-102(A) belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when
due, after reasonable notice to the client of a intention to withdraw, unless the right of
the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed
portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved." Ill. S. Ct. R. 9-102.
254. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 722 (Apr. 30, 1981), reprinted in ILL. B.J., Aug.
1981, at 782.
255. Id.
256. See Simon v. Auler, 508 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d
127 (Ill. 1987).
A client who has executed a retainer contract and paid a substantial retainer
fee to an attorney must be able to recover a portion of the retainer fee upon
discharging the attorney after he has performed only a small amount of work.
A contrary holding would seriously infringe upon the client's right to discharge
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for work that the attorney has not done, the fee necessarily is exces-
sive.2 57 As if to emphasize its double speak, Opinion 722 stated:
In ISBA Opinion 432, this Committee held that it is proper for a law-
yer to make a contract for professional services which provides that a
substantial retainer deposit with the lawyer may be retained no mat-
ter how much work the lawyer does in the case, provided the [retainer
is not excessive] ...
....... [W]e also stated that a lawyer was not entitled to retain
funds advanced by a client for time never spent by the law firm, even
though the law firm might stand ready to perform.
25 '
So in Illinois, the bar association has opined that it is ethical for a
lawyer to provide that an advance fee payment is nonrefundable, but if
the client discharges the lawyer before the work is completed, the
nonrefundable advance fee payment is refundable to the extent of the
uncompleted work. In short, according to the Illinois State Bar Associ-
ation, nonrefundable retainers are refundable.
(4) State Law and a Uniform Federal Bankruptcy Law
Even if the McDonald court's characterization of Illinois law is
correct, the court's opinion should still be rejected. According to the
McDonald court, "there can be no uniform rule as to whether fee ap-
plications are required in order for debtors' counsel to use a pre-peti-
tion retainer."1 59 Rather, whether an advance fee payment is subject to
the requirements of sections 330 and 331 is a matter of "state law,
rather than the Code."2 60 Thus, the court argued, "It has long been
recognized that 'Congress has generally left the determination of prop-
erty rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law' and that
'state laws are. . . suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with
the [bankruptcy] system.' ,,261
Although Congress has allowed states to strike different balances
257. See Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 820 S.W.2d 263 (Ark. 1991).
If a lawyer charges a reasonable [nonrefundable) retainer and is retained for
the purpose of providing specified services, but never performs those services,
the fee charged would become unreasonable. Just as a lawyer cannot bill a
client for work he has never performed in the past, a lawyer cannot bill a client
for work he will never perform in the future.
Id. at 264.
258. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 722 (Apr. 30, 1981), reprinted in ILL. B.J., Aug.
1981, at 782, 786,
259. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
260. Id. at 997.
261. Id. at 996 (brackets supplied by court) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440
U.S. 48, 54 & n.9 (1979)).
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between the interests of debtors and creditors, 262 it has not indicated
an intent to permit variances among the states on whether sections 330
and 331 apply to advance fee payments to attorneys. To the contrary,
congressional intent is clear: "Payments to a debtor's attorney provide
serious potential for evasion of creditor protection provisions of the
bankruptcy laws, and serious potential for overreaching by the debtor's
attorney, and should be subject to careful scrutiny. ' 22 Thus, contrary
to the McDonald court, the attorney fee regulatory scheme set forth in
the Code is not subject to the vagaries of fifty states' law and the opin-
ings of a hundred bar associations.
Because the debtor is vulnerable to overreaching by attorneys and
because the debtor's attorney represents not only the interests of the
debtor but also the interests of the estate's unsecured creditors, Con-
gress does not allow attorneys to bargain freely with debtors, and
bankruptcy courts have the authority to supervise and remake their fee
agreements. 64 As one court stated:
Describing the retainer as "fully earned and nonrefundable" does not
make it so, as the Court, and only the Court, has the power and duty
to determine whether, and to what extent, any sum has been earned
or should be returned.
... [Flees in bankruptcy cases are not entirely a matter of con-
tract between counsel and client, and by statute any such agreement,
and therefore the terms of the [fee agreement], are subject to review,
modification, and outright cancellation by the Court. Any such agree-
ment is nothing more than a framework for an award by the Court,
with whom decisions concerning extent and frequency of compensa-
tion are squarely and solely placed. Consequently, the terms of the
[fee agreement] are determined by statute and by the sound exercise
of the Court's discretion. The relevance and impact of any agreement
262. For example, each state has its own exemption laws, including the ubiquitous
homestead exemption, that exempt certain property from the claims of creditors.
263. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 329 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6285; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5825 (setting forth the legislative history of § 329).
264. Freedom of contract is necessarily limited in the bankruptcy context.
Bankruptcy counsel and debtors are not at liberty to bargain away the rights
and responsibilities of a debtor-in-possession, nor the protections afforded
creditors and other parties in interest in a bankruptcy case, under the guise of
freedom of contract. They cannot evade the jurisdiction of the Court by choice,
nor limit exercise of the Court's discretion by fiat. They cannot negate or defer
application of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules by design. A prepetition agree-
ment between counsel and a prospective debtor-in-possession which purports
to do any of these things cannot be considered reasonable and cannot be con-
doned as such in a Chapter 11 case.
In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212, 225 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
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between debtor and counsel are accordingly limited.26 5
By finding that an attorney and debtor can unilaterally contract
for a compensation agreement that transfers the debtor's property
prior to bankruptcy, the McDonald court has significantly departed
from the spirit and the letter of the Bankruptcy Code. McDonald
would allow parties, by contract, to circumnavigate the express intent
of Congress.2s6 Under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code 2 7 attorneys
must apply to the Court to receive compensation for services that they
already have rendered. Congress enacted section 330 because it is only
after the attorney has performed the services that a court can decide
whether the fee charged was "reasonable" and whether the services
performed were "actual, necessary services" that benefitted the bank-
ruptcy estate.266 Congress placed the burden of proving the reasonable-
ness of the fee on the attorney.269 By allowing the parties to contract
out of the fee application process, the McDonald court sought to dis-
pense with the requirements of section 330.
The only court scrutiny that an advance fee would receive under
McDonald is an after-the-fact disclosure under section 329.270 Under
that section the court, on its own motion or on motion of any party,'1 '
265. In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 574-75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1986). In McDonald the court could cite no cases that agreed with its logic or holding.
However, in reaching its conclusion, the McDonald court rather disingenuously cited the
Chapel Gate case for the proposition that it was "setting forth a retainer agreement in
which it is stated that the retainer is 'fully earned and nonrefundable upon its payment
and receipt' and that the client 'will be entitled to services to be provided by this firm at
the hourly rates specified ... up to the full amount of the retainer.'" In re McDonald
Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 1000 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1990) (quoting Chapel Gate, 64
B.R. at 579). However, the McDonald court neglected to cite Chapel Gate's holding in
which the court stated, "Describing the retainer as 'fully earned and nonrefundable' does
not make it so, as the Court, and only the Court, has the power and duty to determine
whether, and to what extent, any sum has been earned or should be returned." Chapel
Gate, 64 B.R. at 574.
266. The fact that § 328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code includes the term "retainer"
does not mean that any fee agreement that an attorney and client agree upon and call a
retainer is therefore reasonable and within the Code's parameters. In re NBI, Inc., 129
B,R. 212, 222 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). "The Court, in its discretion, must make this deter-
mination." Id, (citing In re Leff, 88 B.R. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988)).
267, 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
268. Id.; see also In re James Contracting Group, Inc., 120 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that legal services must have benefitted the estate to be
compensable).
269. "When a fee application comes before the court, the burden of proof of the
reasonableness of the fee request is on the applicant. The standard of proof is 'prepon-
derance of the evidence.'" James Contracting, 120 B.R. at 872 (citations omitted).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988).
271. BANKR. R. 2017.
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can review any fees paid 7 2 to the debtor's attorney during the year
prior to the bankruptcy filing, and if a court finds the fee "excessive,"
it can order the fee returned to the estate or to the entity that paid
it. 27 s
The burden of proof is not on the attorney under section 329, as it
is under section 330. Under section 329 the burden of proof is on the
party who seeks to have the attorney fee struck as excessive. The bur-
den on the moving party is a high one; some courts hold that the fee
must "shock the conscience" of the court for it to be "excessive."'2 7'
(5) Section 329 Countenances Advance Fee Payments
A possible argument that McDonald did not advance in support of
its position is contained in section 329:
(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title,
or in connection with such a case, whether or not such attorney ap-
plies for compensation under this title, shall file with the court a
statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such pay-
ment or agreement was made after one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, for services rendered or to be rendered in con-
templation of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and the
source of such compensation.
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any
such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the
return of any such payment, to the extent excessive ....27
Because section 329 addresses compensation for services "to be
rendered," and provides for the cancellation or modification of agree-
ments to render future services, it can be argued that advance fee pay-
ments are not within the parameters of sections 330 and 331. Indeed,
section 329 can be read to infer that a payment in advance for services
to be rendered is an exchange of "reasonably equivalent value," and
therefore not avoidable under section 548.276 It is possible and more
plausible, however, to read section 329 in a manner that is consistent
272. The court also can examine promises to pay fees in the future that are made
prior to the Oetition's filing. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) (1988).
273. Id. § 329(b).
274. Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc. (In re Beverly Crest Conva-
lescent Hosp., Inc.), 548 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that under the predecessor
statute to the Act, the fee must "shock the conscience" of the court); York Int'l Bldg.,
Inc. v. Chaney (In re York Int'l Bldg., Inc.), 527 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1975); In re
D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the party who ob-
jects to the attorney fee has the burden of proof).
275. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1988) (emphasis added).
276. Id. § 548(d)(2)(A); see supra notes 195-98, 200-05 and accompanying text.
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with sections 330, 331, and 548. The critical phrases in section 329 are:
(1) "a statement of the compensation paid," or
(2) compensation "agreed to be paid,"
(3) "for services rendered," or




The proper reading of section 329, and one that is consistent with
other Code sections, is that the attorney must provide a statement of
(a) compensation paid for services rendered, (1) and (3) above, and (b)
compensation agreed to be paid for future services, (2) and- (4) above;
and not (c) compensation paid for future services, (1) and (4) above.
This reading rejects the conclusion that section 329 renders sections
330, 331, and 548 inapplicable to advance payments for future services.
b. In re D.L.I.C., Inc.
The court in In re D.L.LC., Inc. 278 quickly accepted and exceeded
the invitation-by-example that the McDonald court extended to fash-
ion another special rule for lawyers. In D.L.I.C. unsecured creditors ob-
jected to a $17,000 advance fee payment. 79 McDonald, having vitiated
sections 330 and 331, only partially vitiated section 329-leaving the
option to challenge the excessiveness of the advance fee payment to
any interested party but declining "in the absence of any challenge to
.. .inquire further" sua sponte. 280 The D.L.I.C. court went a step fur-
ther and did to section 329 what McDonald did to sections 330 and
331.
A closer look at the arguments of the D.L.LC. court reveals incor-
rect interpretations of the Code, bar association opinions, and ethics
laws, ala those of the McDonald opinion. In McDonald the court found
that under state law the advance fee was to be deposited into the at-
torney's account rather than into the client security account; thus the
advance fee was not funds of the estate for the purposes of sections 330
and 331.281 The D.L.LC. court held that this reasoning also applies to
section 329 and therefore puts the issue of excessiveness as per section
277. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) (1988).
278. 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
279. This type of action, which was brought by the unsecured creditors rather than
the debtor in possession, illustrates the inherent conflict of interest that is created when
a debtor makes a prepetition advance payment. The debtor in possession, who, as the
debtor, originally employed the attorney, is not likely to oppose the employment con-
tract to which it was a party, even though the debtor in possession has this duty as a
fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate.
280. In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 1003 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1990).
281. Id. at 1002.
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329 beyond the purview of a bankruptcy court when the advance fee
payment is found not to be funds of the estate. 82 Indeed, the court
read the statute in a way that would never allow a challenge to an
advance fee payment based upon excessiveness.
283
282. D.L.LC., 120 B.R. at 350. "The critical question in this case is whether or not
the retainer which the debtor paid to its attorneys should be regarded as property of the
estate as expressed in 11 U.S.C. § 329(b)(1)(A)." Id. The court dismissed the case be-
cause the objecting creditors offered insufficient evidence on the terms of the agreement
and how the attorneys treated the payment for the court to determine whether the pay-
ment was property of the estate.
283. Before addressing whether the fee was excessive, the court concocted a thresh-
old issue and stated that the creditors must show, as a prerequisite to an examination of
the reasonableness 6f the fee, that the fee was in fact property of the estate. Id. at 351.
The court stated that this requirement is necessary because § 329(b)(1)(A) allows return
of the fee payment to the estate only if "the property transferred would have been prop-
erty of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 329(b)(1)(A) (1988). The court concluded that the ad-
vance payment must be "property of the estate," as defined in § 541, 11 U.S.C. § 541
(1988 & Supp. II 1990), before the court can examine it. Section 541(a) defines those
property interests of the debtor that pass into the bankruptcy estate at the commence-
ment of the case. The basic rule is that only those property interests that the debtor held
as of the commencement of the case become property of the estate. Id. § 541(a)(1)-(2)
(1988). However, § 541(a)(3) states that property of the estate also includes "[a]ny inter-
est in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b)." Id. § 541(a)(3).
Inexplicably, and in contravention of the statute, the court dismissed the unsecured
creditor's challenge.
[Tihe court is unable to determine that the prepetition retainer which the
debtor paid to its attorneys before the Chapter 11 case was commenced should
be regarded as property of the estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541.
... [T]he objecting creditors have not presented sufficient facts for this
court to sustain their objection, which is dismissed for lack of evidence as to
whether or not the prepetition retainer should be regarded as property of the
estate.
. . . [T]he prepetition retainer which the debtor paid to its attorneys,
which was disclosed in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) may be refunded as
excessive only if such retainer fee would have been property of the estate as
stated in 11 U.S.C. § 329(b)(1)(a).
Because the objecting creditors have not established that the prepetition
retainer which the debtor paid to its attorneys should be regarded as property
of the estate, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541, it follows that their objec-
tion on the ground of excessiveness is hereby dismissed.
D.L.LC., 120 B.R. at 351-52.
The court required the objecting creditors to show that the fee was property of the
estate, as defined in § 541 and which includes "[a]ny interest in property that the trustee
recovers under section 329(b)." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1988). However, the court refused
to allow the creditors to recover the fee under § 329 until they showed that the property
was already within § 541. This is a problem of existential dimension because the D.L.I.C.
court has established a circular argument under which there can never be a § 329
recovery.
Obviously, the statute was not designed to work this way; it otherwise would have no
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Like McDonald, the D.L.I.C. court based its arguments on a faulty
reading of state law-this time the law of New York rather than Illi-
nois-and concluded that advance payments can be deposited into the
attorney's account. As in McDonald, the D.L.LC. court used a bar as-
sociation opinion, Opinion 570 of the Committee on Professional Eth-
ics of the New York State Bar Association,284 as the basis for its deter-
mination of state law. 28 5 If Opinion 570 were merely a weak reed,,the
court's sole reliance on the opinion would be as objectionable as Mc-
Donald's reliance on Illinois Bar Association Opinions. Opinion 570 is,
however, a broken reed.2 8  Its textual interpretations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are illogical, inconsistent with other Code
of Professional Responsibility provisions, and irrelevant. 87 Opinion
570's policy goals were professionally irresponsible,288 as was its rejec-
tion of fundamental principles of fiduciary law.
28 9
In an attempt to rival McDonald, the D.L.LC. court made its own
contribution to the obfuscation of attorney-client retainer agreement
law. Thus, it created another form of retainer agreement: The "flat fee
retainer," which, according to the court, "covers all services to be ren-
dered by the attorneys for the debtor in a bankruptcy case and [is] not
effect at all. Section 329 merely requires that the judge review the fee for excessiveness.
Section 329(b) was set up to ensure that the proper payor receives a refund if the fee
payment is excessive. The structure of § 329(b) indicates that if an advance fee payment
is judged excessive, the judge, in remedying the situation, can return the fee either to
"the estate," id. § 329(b)(1), or to "the entity that made such payment," id. § 329(b)(2).
The legislative history of § 329 states:
Subsection (b) permits the court to deny compensation to the attorney, to
cancel an agreement to pay compensation, or to order the return of compensa-'
tion paid, if the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of the services pro-
vided. The return of payments already made are generally to the trustee for
the benefit of the estate. However, if the property would not have come into
the estate in any event, the court will order it returned to the entity that made
the payment.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5825; H.R. REP. No, 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 329 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6285-86.
284. New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 570 (June 7, 1985).
285. D.L.I.C., 120 B.R. at 350-51.
286. It is doubtful that any bar association ethical opinion has ever been so thor-
oughly discredited in the literature as New York Opinion 570. See Brickman, Advance
Fees, supra note 144, at 654-75. The senior author of this Article was a member of the
committee that rendered New York Opinion 570.
287. Id. at 656-66.
288. Id. at 667-70.
289. Id. at 672-73. By virtue of its intense self-interestedness, New York Opinion
570 is strong support for the argument made in Part VI(B)(2)(a)(ii)(4) that the Bank-
ruptcy Code should provide uniform treatment for advance fee payments and attorney
fee applications. See supra notes 259-74 and accompanying text.
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regarded as belonging to the debtor after payment is made."'29 0 By
making the advance paid flat fee nonrefundable, the court apparently
has imported elements of the general retainer into the flat fee pot-
pourri. There is no such thing as the flat fee retainer drafted by the
D.L.IC. court. Of course, an attorney and a client can agree on a flat
fee for certain work, rather than an hourly rate or contingent fee. How-
ever, if a flat fee is negotiated and paid in advance, it is really a special
retainer advance fee payment and is therefore indistinguishable from a
special retainer advance fee payment for work to be done on a hourly
basis. A client who pays a flat fee is paying for actual legal services to
be rendered and not merely for the attorney's availability as is the case
under a true general retainer. The flat fee therefore is refundable. An
attorney who has received an advance flat fee payment is relegated to
quantum meruit if the client discharges the attorney before the attor-
ney completes the services required by the contract. 91
The D.L.LC. court may have gone even further than simply hold-
ing that advance fee payments are substantially insulated from section
329 under New York law. Although its full effect is unclear, D.L.LC.
may have created a second unsustainable burden, not only in New
York but in every state, for creditors or other parties in interest who
contest the excessiveness of an advance fee payment under section 329.
Consider the following language:
In the instant case [when creditors are contesting the advance fee
payment], there was no evidence as to whether or not the retainer
agreement was written or verbal, nor was there any evidence as to
what the parties intended when the debtor advanced the prepetition
retainer funds to the attorneys for the debtor. Moreover, there was no
evidence as to how the attorneys treated the funds, in which account
they deposited the money, whether or not the objecting creditors chal-
lenged the debtor's attorneys' treatment of the retainer or that such
treatment was improper. Accordingly, the court is unable to deter-
mine that the prepetition retainer which the debtor paid to its attor-
neys before the Chapter 11 case was commenced should be regarded
as property of the estate within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541.92
Because the information that the court found necessary to sustain the
creditors' burden was solely in the possession of the attorney-a party
adverse to the creditors' claims-and because the failure of the credi-
tors to present this unavailable information to the court necessitated
dismissal of their action, it appears that under D.L.IC. general credi-
tors cannot contest the excessiveness of advance fee payments.
290. In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348, 350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
291. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 5, at 155-56.
292. D.L.LC., 120 B.R. at 351.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The regulation of lawyers' fees in bankruptcy proceedings is fol-
lowing much the same pattern that other societal efforts to regulate
attorney fees have followed: determined resistance from the bar fol-
lowed by societal acquiescence. The Bankruptcy Code's adoption sig-
nificantly vitiated the strict fee regulations of the Bankruptcy Act. The
Code's regulatory scheme, embodied in sections 329 and 331, however,
continues to require judicial superintendence of lawyer fees. These sur-
viving regulatory provisions are now under attack from the bankruptcy
bar, and in McDonald and D.L.I.C. the assault on regulation prevailed.
According to these decisions, lawyers, and only lawyers, can use ad-
vance fee payments to escape judicial scrutiny of their fees.
This Article attempts to check the assault on the lawyers' fee regu-
latory apparatus. By engaging in a close analysis of the McDonald and
D.L.LC. decisions, and in particular the courts' tortured rendering of
retainer law and misconstruction of relevant Bankruptcy Code provi-
sions, our intent is to demonstrate not only the policy implications of
these decisions but also the unacceptability of their analyses.
Putting the quietus to McDonald and D.L.LC. may blunt the as-
sault for a while, but the history of bar resistance to attorney fee regu-
lation indicates that the assault likely will resume. Advance fee pay-
ments seem likely to be the centerpiece of any renewed effort to
surmount the Code's regulatory scheme. In this Article we have sug-
gested that the Bankruptcy Code may well prohibit advance fee pay-
ments.293 Even if advance fee payments are not prohibited, however,
their use raises significant policy questions.
A. Advance Fee Payments Are Disfavored Under the Code
It is evident from the structure and legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that Congress prefers that bankruptcy courts measure the
value of lawyer services and award attorney compensation after the at-
torney has performed the services because only after the attorney has
rendered services can the worth of such services be known.2 9 4 The use
293, To recapitulate, accepting a prepetition retainer creates a potential § 548
fraudulent transfer. The debtor, in return for valid consideration, receives only a promise
of future services, Unlike a contract for insurance that stretches into the future, an ad-
vance fee contract requires substantial future performance from the attorney. A prepeti-
tion retainer payment given in exchange for work that the attorney promises to do in the
future would appear to be a transfer of the debtor's money for an "unperformed promise
to furnish support in the future," and therefore not for "value." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A)
(1988); see supra notes 193-96, 198-202 and accompanying text.
294. Under §§ 330 and 331, an attorney can receive compensation only after the
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of advance fee payments works against this congressional goal and the
spirit and letter of the Code.
B. Advance Fee Payments Are Inefficient
A bankruptcy schema that encourages debtors to pay their attor-
neys prior to a court award of compensation and later requires the
court or other party to assert a claim against the attorney to recapture
the payment wastes both the court's and the parties' resources. More
than the parochial interests of attorney and client are at stake in ad-
judging the efficiency of advance fee payments in bankruptcy. It is det-
rimental to the economy to allow attorneys to carve out and set aside
some of the debtor's assets prior to the attorney's performance of legal
services and the genesis of a fixed claim against the estate's assets.
Prepetition retainers sap vital capital from the debtor when it is most
needed. Once the automatic stay takes effect, debtors should be able to
use their capital to meet new obligations and should not have to worry
about the satisfaction of prepetition obligations. If attorneys tie up
that capital, however, it hinders the debtors' ability to meet the rigid
payment requirements that suppliers often impose on insolvent cus-
tomers and the new obligations incurred during the reorganization.
The practice of quarantining debtor assets benefits only attorneys. The
myriad other parties interested in the debtor's financial turnaround,
including creditors, suppliers, and customers, are adversely affected by
this practice.
C. Conflicts of Interest
Prepetition retainers create a host of conflict of interest problems.
It is a maxim of the legal profession that an attorney and client must
be united in interest. In the bankruptcy context the estate's attorney
represents not only the debtor in possession but also the interests of
the unsecured creditors. In order to fulfill the duty to maximize the
estate's assets for the benefit of unsecured creditors, the attorney must
act as an antagonist to parties that hold security interests in the
debtor's property. The existence of a potentially fraudulent transfer
work has been done. This is necessary because it is only at that time that the value of
the attorney's services to the estate can be known and examined. The court can grant
only "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services." 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)
(1988). The court can grant interim compensation only for "services rendered before the
date of" the application for interim compensation. Id. § 331; see also S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-42 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5826-28; H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 329-31, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286-87
(describing factors used to determine reasonable compensation).
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mandates that the estate's attorney pursue the property interest that is
transferred. However, if the estate's attorney is the transferee, the at-
torney must counsel the debtor in possession or trustee on whether the
bankruptcy estate should pursue a claim against the attorney's own
property-an obviously untenable position. The conflict is acute be-
cause in practice the attorney is more than just an agent for the client.
The debtor in possession, often a business with experienced manage-
ment, must focus on winning back suppliers and customers. Debtors in
possession rely on their attorneys to think for them on legal matters.
The parties whose interests suffer are the unsecured creditors because
although the debtor in possession wants to maximize the estate's as-
sets, it rarely shares the zeal of the unsecured creditors-those who are
most at risk.29 5
A similar conflict would arise if the attorney had a property inter-
est that was potentially a claim under sections 329, 544, 547 or other
similar provisions. The mere possibility of a valid claim is enough to
create a potential conflict of interest and adversely affect the attorney's
fiduciary duty to the client.
Moreover, if the applicable state law permits the deposit of
unearned funds into the attorney's office account, the debtor's property
becomes subject to the attorney's creditors. Considering the Bank-
ruptcy Code's overwhelming concern for the interests of debtors and
295. The debtor in possession (or trustee) has, in the first instance, the right to
invoke § 548(a) or 544(b); this right belongs to the estate and not to any one creditor.
Creditors may bring a derivative suit, but must first demonstrate to the court that the
debtor/trustee has shirked his duty. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th
Cir. 1988).
In Chapter 11 cases the appointment of an unsecured creditors committee is
mandatory. 11 U.S.C. 1102 (1988). However, in practice, there is often no creditors com-
mittee or no active creditors committee, particularly in small cases. 1 BANKR. LAW. EDI-
TION § 41:9 cmt., at 9 (1987).
The primary duty of the creditors committee is to negotiate the terms of a plan of
reorganization, not to involve itself with the day-to-day operations of the estate. In re
Structurlite Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988). Creditors committees
have been permitted to intervene in an adversary proceeding to bring an action to re-
cover preferences and fraudulent transfers when it could be shown that the trustee had
failed to do so. In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 39 B.R. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding that it is unreasonable to expect a debtor to zealously prosecute its own presi-
dent to recover a preference).
The threshold issue for creditors committees under these circumstances is whether
they have standing to proceed. Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762
F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985). Once standing is established, the creditors committee may ask
the court to require the trustee/debtor in possession to bring the preference or fraudu-
lent transfer action or allow the committee to bring the action itself. In re Evergreen
Valley Resort, Inc., 27 B.R. 75 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Official Creditors' Committee v.
Alloy Automotive Co. (In re Wesco Prods. Co.), 22 B.R. 107 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
1098 (Vol. 43
62
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss4/11
RETAINER AGREEMENTS
creditors, it is inconceivable that those interests should be jeopardized
for the benefit of attorneys.
2 98
Finally, while we have stated that security retainers as described
in McDonald do not exist, assuming arguendo that they are valid, con-
flicts of interest again arise. Because the attorney presumably takes a
security interest in the advance payment-a concept that we have de-
rided, the attorney becomes a secured creditor of the estate. As a fidu-
ciary of the bankruptcy estate, the attorney must decide whether to
commence proceedings against the holder of the equitable inter-
est-the attorney.
If the court recognizes the validity of security retainers and there-
fore the validity of the attorneys' security interest in the estate, it
would thereby enable attorneys to elevate their dissolution priority
from an administrative claim to a secured claim. When a bankruptcy
case is converted from a Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 dis-
solution, the Code, in order to facilitate the orderly administration of
dissolution, requires that the Chapter 7 attorneys be paid before the
Chapter 11 adnministrative claimants.29 This provision encourages at-
torneys to take the case by helping to ensure that they will be compen-
sated first out of the remaining unsecured assets. By taking a prepeti-
tion security interest in the fee, the Chapter 11 attorney circumvents
the Code298 and is satisfied ahead of the Chapter 7 attorney.
The policy arguments in opposition to the use of prepetition ad-
vance fee payments must be balanced against lawyers' economic inter-
ests in their use for purposes other than circumventing the regulatory
scheme of sections 329 and 330. Representing insolvent clients involves
risk. Moreover, bankruptcy lawyers complain that bankruptcy court
fee regulation is highly uneven and idiosyncratic.
Lawyer complaints about the fee application process, if true, raise
legitimate complaints that fall into four categories: (1) Lack of uni-
formity among bankruptcy judges about what tasks are compensable,
(2) lack of uniformity about the permissible rates for compensable ser-
vices, (3) uncertainty about whether sufficient assets will be available
to pay attorney compensation once it is awarded, and (4) the minimum
296. In addition, because the debtor maintains a reversionary interest in the fee to
the extent that it has not been earned, the bankruptcy estate has a property interest in
the attorney's assets. See supra note 174.
297. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). This provision might be thought of as a requirement
to pay the undertaker before the doctor.
298. Contra In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)
(holding that attorneys who receive security interests in advance fee payments are to be
treated as any other secured creditor of the bankruptcy estate, and therefore they have
priority over administrative claims such as Chapter 7 attorney expenses) (quoting In re
Burnside Steel Foundary Co., 90 B.R. 942, 944 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988)).
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120 day period that attorneys must wait before they can receive any
compensation.
Caprice in matters of bankruptcy compensation should be ad-
dressed on a national basis. Uniformity would help alleviate the forum
shopping engaged in by debtors' attorneys for their own benefit.2 99
Bankruptcy attorneys allege that tasks which are compensable at a
paralegal's rate in one venue are compensable at an associate's rate in
another venue, and indeed, variance exists from judge to judge within
the same district.,0 0 Bankruptcy fee regulations should be set out in
detail sufficient to preclude these types of inequities. Detailed regula-
tions, if they established uniform compensation rules and possibly uni-
form rates within each venue, would significantly ameliorate the bank-
ruptcy practitioners' fears of being inadequately compensated for work
that already has been completed and therefore reduce the attorneys'
incentive to circumvent court supervision through creative prepetition
299, Typically, forum shopping is done to secure an advantage for the client, e.g.,
seeking a more favorable state law or a more debtor-oriented bankruptcy court. How-
ever, unlike forum shopping for the benefit of the client, the textual reference is to forum
shopping for the benefit of the lawyer. If forum shopping for the benefit of the client is
frowned upon by the legal community and those who make publi6 policy, forum shop-
ping for the benefit of the advocate is particularly objectionable. Indeed, because pre-
serving the estate is in the interest of the debtor and its employees, creditors, equity
holders, and customers, as well as society at large, searching for a forum that will allow
the highest cost attorneys to service the estate conflicts with basic bankruptcy policies.
The search by bankruptcy professionals for forums that allow high-cost reimburse-
ment for bankruptcy services has been documented in the bankruptcy reorganizations of
many large publicly held companies. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Pub-
licly Held Companies, 11 Wis. L. REV. 11, 33, 36-37 (1991).
It is interesting to note that although large American companies often have relo-
cated to areas with lower labor costs, they nevertheless choose to petition for bankruptcy
court protection in venues in which the cost of attorneys is known to be among the
highest in the nation.
When forum shopping occurred, the destination of choice was usually New
York City. Even though none of the companies studied had substantial opera-
tions in New York City, thirteen of the forty-three cases studied (thirty per-
cent) proceeded in New York City. In two additional cases (five percent), par-
ties filed petitions in New York City in unsuccessful attempts to proceed there.
Id. at 29. Cases filed in New York City remained pending nearly five months longer than
cases in other districts, despite the fact that the New York City cases were "considerably
smaller" in number of employees, sales, and assets than cases studied in other venues.
Id. at 31-34, nn.68-69.
300. The authors of this Article were informed by an attorney who practices in a
venue with two bankruptcy judges that the judges have divergent views on what services
can be performed by a paralegal and what services must be performed by a lawyer.
Therefore, in the early stages of any case, at least until the judge is assigned, the attor-
ney is uncertain whether to assign particular tasks to associates or paralegals so as to
avoid performing work that might go uncompensated or undercompensated.
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Recognizing the economic realities of conducting a law practice
and easing the bankruptcy professional's cash flow problems also
would reduce the incentive to use prepetition retainer agreements.
When first employed by a debtor, the attorney needs time to evaluate
the debtor's options before the attorney can recommend that the
debtor file a petition for bankruptcy. If a petition eventually is filed,
however, the attorney could remain uncompensated for these services
until, at a minimum, 120 days after the order for relief is granted.
3 0 2
Accordingly, attorneys should not have to wait the statutorily provided
120 days to apply for compensation.3 3 Particularly at the beginning of
the case, attorneys should be able to seek compensation for prepetition
work no later than thirty days after an order for relief has been en-
tered, and at ninety-day intervals thereafter.
The validity of lawyers' complaints about the actions of bank-
ruptcy judges in superintending fees, however, is not a valid reason for
the functional elimination of sections 329, 330, and 331 of the Code.
Even if the problems faced by bankruptcy practitioners were com-
pletely ameliorated by these proposals, attempts to evade judicial scru-
tiny of attorney fees would no doubt continue. Indeed, McDonald and
D.L.I.C. can be viewed, in a historical context, as simply at-
tempts-noteworthy mainly for their lack of success-to create an-
other special law for lawyers while at the same time permitting bank-
ruptcy courts to shed their responsibility to supervise lawyers' fees.3 0'
301. Fee guidelines for bankruptcy professionals are under active consideration by
bankruptcy courts and the regional offices of the United States Trustee. Barbara Frank-
lin, Passing Fee Inspection, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1992, at 5, col. 2. More specificity in fee
applications and more uniform treatment of disbursements have resulted from guidelines
issued in July 1992 by the Southern District of New York. Id.
302. See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). Lawyers' fees presumably include an interest com-
ponent as compensation for anticipated time delay.
303. Id. Attorneys may apply for interim compensation every 120 days. However,
even if compensation is awarded, the attorney may not receive it for several weeks or
even several months.
See Rick Dower, Creditor Objects to Omni's Legal and PR Expenditures, SAN DIEGO
Bus. J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 5 (stating that an attorney demanded a large advance fee and
justified the fee because he would not be able to obtain payment for at least 120 days,
whereas for nonbankruptcy work, a smaller advance fee was requested because it would
only have to cover a 30-day period).
304. Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (But who would guard the guards them-
selves?) Juvenal, VI Satires line 347, quoted in J. BARTLErT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 122
(E. Beck 15th ed. 1980).
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